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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship is in a permanent state of inchoateness. Over
the years academics have expressed doubt as to whether law is a valid
subject of scholarship.' This doubt has persisted through the three
stages of "traditional" scholarship: vocational, doctrinal, and interdis-
ciplinary.2 Inchoateness continues with the recent appearance of
"Nontraditional scholarship."
Doctrinal writing (the synthesis and criticism of cases and laws)3 is
an extension of vocational4 (the description of what the law is) while
interdisciplinary (the use of other disciplines to explain law)5 evolved
from doctrinal. In all three forms, "law"-cases, statutes, and rules-
is the unifying theme. Writers seek to resolve legal conflicts or to
change conventional wisdom. The objective is to influence a target
pool of judges, colleagues, lawyers, and lawmakers. 6
Nontraditional scholarship is defined by style and objective. It is
subjective, polemical, and candidly ideologically motivated. The bulk
of the new scholarship comes from the politically left people of Critical
1. See W. Lawrence Church, A Plea for Readable Law Review Articles, 1989 Wis. L.
REv. 739; Commentary, Of Correspondence and Commentary, 24 CoNN. L. REv.
159 (1991); Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Future of Legal Scholarship and the
Search for a Modern Theory of Law, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 381 (1986); George D.
Gopen, The State of Legal Writing: Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86 MicH. L. REv. 333
(1987); David L. Gregory, The Assault on Scholarship, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv.
993 (1991); Philip C. Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L.
REv. 221 (1988); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of
Truth and Tenure, 103 HARv. L. REv. 926 (1990); Richard A. Posner, The Present
Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113 (1981); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to
Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REv. 279 (1962); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law
Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38 (1936).
2. Vocational writing is descriptive of cases, statutes, or administrative rulings.
Doctrinal and interdisciplinary would fall within Rubin's "standard legal scholar-
ship," "an essentially prescriptive approach that acknowledges its normative ba-
sis. Contemporary legal scholars are now generally aware that their work
consists of recommendations addressed to legal decision-makers, recommenda-
tions that are ultimately derived from value judgments rather than objective
truth." Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86
MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1904 (1988).
3. "It involves the careful reading and comparison of appellate opinions with a view
to identifying ambiguities, exposing inconsistencies among cases and lines of
cases, developing distinctions, reconciling holdings, and otherwise exercising the
characteristic skills of legal analysis." Posner, supra note 1, at 1113.
4. Stevens concluded that producing vocational work "might well be the kiss of
death for one who wants to be employed in one of our leading law schools." Rob-
ert Stevens, American Legal Scholarship: Structural Constraints and Intellec-
tual Conceptualism, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 442, 446 (1983).
5. Posner divides interdisciplinary scholarship into two parts: the positive and the
normative. "Positive analysis is the effort to understand phenomena, here legal
phenomena, and normative analysis is the effort to prescribe and reform the law."
Posner, supra note 1, at 1119.
6. Rubin, supra note 2.
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Legal Studies, the advocates of various forms of feminism, and the
Critical Race Theory movement. Types of nontraditional composition
include doggerel,7 photography,8 ramblings on pop culture,9 haiku,LO
Death-Row Articles1l and the most popular-and controversial-
storytelling.12
While nontraditional articles appear regularly in the journals,13
traditional work is still the primary product. Many traditionalists do
not know about the new writings,' 4 or ignore them. To some profes-
sors, nontraditional work is the practice of politics rather than legal
scholarship. 15
Nontraditional authors argue that their work is a new form of
scholarship that is just as credible as the accepted forms. Feminists
and minorities say that their writing reflects a unique "voice" that
traditional literature cannot capture.' 6 To the crits, traditional schol-
arship camouflages an oppressive political agenda.17
At the center of the conflict is a critical issue: should nontradi-
tional scholarship be given the same status as traditional scholarship
in the promotion and tenure process? Likewise, should it be accepted
to justify other rewards such as stipends and salary increases?
It is an issue whose time has come. The AALS Report of the Spe-
cial Committee on Tenure and the Tenuring Process recently recom-
mended: 'The school should commit itself to avoiding prejudice
against any particular methodology or perspective used in teaching or
scholarship. When evaluating any work embodying innovative or less
7. See, e.g., Brenda Waugh, A Theory of Employment Discrimination, 40 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 113 (1990).
8. See, e.g., Barbara Kruger, Art-Commentary, 97 YALE L.J. 1105 (1988).
9. See, e.g., Symposium: Popular Legal Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1545 (1989).
10. See, e.g., Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Vietnam Haiku, 74 CoRuT. L. REv. 1228 (1989).
11. Ken Myers, Could Death-Row Articles Be Part of a Wew Wave of Scholarship'?,
NATL L.J., April 1, 1991, at 4.
12. See, Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
13. Prompting a federal judge to complain that "many of our law reviews are domi-
nated by rather exotic offerings of increasingly out-of-touch faculty members
.... " United States v. $639,558 in Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
See infra notes 36-37.
14. "Not every law school numbers among its faculty either scholars who use or schol-
ars who read narratives, so there may be no one present who can explain the
objects or innovations of the form. Even those who can offer such explanations
may find it difficult to do so ab initio, because of the time pressures and the con-
tentiousness that often surface in this context. Here, as in other areas of aca-
demic life, the absence of full public discussion of innovation tends to favor those
forms of scholarship that are already established, with palpable consequences for
the professional lives of innovators." Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Sto-
ries, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 977 (1991).
15. See infra notes 36-37.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 36, 54-56.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 44-50.
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widely pursued methodologies or perspectives, the standard should be
neither higher nor lower than the standard used for evaluating more
traditional work."18
The most difficult challenge to evaluation is storytelling. Typically
in narrative form, stories have become the fashion of feminists and
minorities who use them to describe experiences of oppression.19 The
stories are personal and emphatic in the descriptions of the abuses of
patriarchy, hierarchy, and racism. Because of obvious nontraditional
characteristics, stories pose the most difficult challenge to evaluation.
This Article will discuss the problems of evaluating storytelling.
II. THE GRAND LIBERAL TRADITION
Traditional scholarship is derived from a unifying cluster of liberal
values. The liberal legal system dispenses rights, adheres to stare de-
cisis, and seeks truth through confrontation and dialogue. Liberal
writers feel obligated to support these values by identifying and en-
deavoring to resolve problems.20 Following a "grand theory" script,
their writing often advocates change so long as it is consistent with
liberal values.2 1
To the liberal traditionalist, law is a vocational profession in which
lawyers advise and service clients. However technical or complicated,
law is a "job." Likewise, legal scholarship is a job with specific objec-
tives. The process imitates science:2 2 a problem is identified and ana-
18. Report of the AALS Special Committee on Tenure and the Tenuring Process, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 477, 505 (1992).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 67-80.
20. The classical tradition of law scholarship is epitomized in the treatises of Samuel
Williston (Contracts), John Henry Wigmore (Evidence), and Arthur Corbin (Con-
tracts). They were the masters of vocational-doctrinal writing;, large numbers of
cases were compared, analyzed, and criticized. In a succinct and elegant style,
the grand treatise writers succeeded in identifying rules and defining their opera-
tional effects. To the vocationalist, the treatise is the highest form of scholarship.
A legal treatise (which must be a multi-volume set, not a single book) was written
to be read and used by the profession. If Dean Wigmore supported your position,
you won, if Professor Corbin stood against your argument, you talked settlement.
See A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles
and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 632 (1981).
21. A grand theory is a rational deductive system that serves as a frame of reference
for solving problems. See MARx TusmET, RED WMTE AND BLUE: A CRTcAL
ANALYSIS OF CONsTITUIONAL LAw 21-187 (1988).
22. The notion of law as science dates to Langdell. "Langdell, however, had already
concluded that law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doc-
trines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant
facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what consti-
tutes a true lawyer... and the shortest and the best, if not the only way of
mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is embod-
ied ....'" ROBERT STEVENS, Law School: Legal Education in AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980s 52 (1983).
482 [Vol. 74:479
EVALUATING STORYTELLING
lyzed, various positions are recognized and criticized, then comes the
recommended solution. Like science, the process is objective, the dis-
cussion is rational, and the focus is on problem solving.23 Neverthe-
less, the legal article departs from the science model in its role of
making normative statements as prescriptions. 24
The doctrinal article is the personification of the liberal tradition
and "law as an autonomous discipline."25 It has been the dominant
influence in scholarship since World War 11.26 But doctrinal writing
did not establish parity with scholarship from other accepted disci-
plines.27 In the university loop, law professors were (and perhaps still
are) disdained for applying pseudo-scientific methods to a vocational
context and publishing the results in journals edited by law stu-
dents.28 The tactical response to criticism was to co-opt the critics by
the "conscious application of other disciplines"29 to law to produce in-
terdisciplinary scholarship. How could critics find fault with anyone
for appropriating their discipline? Moreover, to the extent that math
and other technical jargon could be used, the analytical character of
legal scholarship was confirmed.
III. DELAWING LAW SCHOOLS AND IDEOLOGY
SCHOLARSHIP
Since the early 1980's, the law academy has been absorbing a new
generation of young faculty who have a different set of values, goals,
23. "In general, the law review articles of the period-or at least those that were seen
as trend setting-took a relatively narrow problem and addressed it doctrinally
and in terms of goal-oriented solutions." Id. at 271.
24. Rubin, supra note 2, at 1903.
25. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline 1962-1987,
100 HARv. L. REv. 761 (1987).
26. According to Posner, doctrinal analysis "is the traditional and still the dominant
mode of legal scholarship." Posner, supra note 1, at 1113.
27. "For example, publication requirements for law professors generally are strik-
ingly modest compared to the standards applicable to faculty in most other disci-
plines. Extensive outside activities divert time and energy from research,
thereby reducing the quantity (and perhaps also the quality) of legal scholarship.
This could reinforce the opinions of intellectual traditionalists who maintain that
law schools do not belong in universities. Law schools in this view are trade
schools whose primary loyalty is to the bar; their existence on campus under-
mines the cohesion of the academic community and detracts from the central pur-
poses of higher education." Jonathan L. Entin, The Law Professor as Advocate,
38 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 512, 532 (1988)(citations omitted). See Gregory, supra
note 1, at 996-98. It'was not until 1969 that Harvard Law School required even a
single article for promotion. JOEL SEUIGMN, THE HIGH CrrADEL: THE INFLUENCE
OF HARVARD LAw SCHOOL 126 (1978).
28. See Arthur D. Austin, The "Custom of Vetting" as a Substitute for Peer Review, 32
Amz. L. REv. 1 (1990).
29. Posner, supra note 25, at 772.
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and perspectives about law.3 0 They do not like the practice of law.31
Many have the Woodstock mentality32 and come from clerking or a
few years with a mega law firm. They do not have good memories of
their experiences in practice and generally scorn practitioners as
greedy and uncaring.3 3 They reject, at least ostensibly, the yuppie
creed that "Greed is healthy."34
Although it is a diverse group composed of blacks, feminists, and
white male leftists, they share a common mission: gain control of the
academy from the traditionalists (white male liberals) and revise the
existing priorities of law.35 Traditional liberal scholarship is viewed
as a weapon for maintaining control over the debate and as a source of
propaganda.36 It is rejected by the new generation.
There was another reason for rejection of the liberal tradition. The
new generation was more in touch with the university culture than
the law academy.3 7 Many speak "a language incomprehensible to law-
30. Posner explains this as the "flight from humanities to law by graduate students
and young faculty, in the 1970s who saw jobs and promotion opportunities drying
up and salaries falling steeply in real (that is, inflation-adjusted) terms and de-
cided to go to law school .... " RICmHAD A. POSNER, LAW AND IrTERATURE: A
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 12 (1988).
31. "[L]aw school teaching increasingly recruits those 'who for one reason or another
are not happy in practice, adapted to practice or interested in practice.'" Martha
Middleton, Legal Scholarship: Is It Irrelevant?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 9, 1989, at 1, 8
(quoting Judge Richard A. Posner).
32. "mesterday's student radical is today's tenured professor or academic dean."
ROGER KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS: How POLITICS HAS CORRUPTED OUR HIGHER
EDUCATION xiv (1990). See Michael W. Hirschorn, A New-Left Challenger Comes
to an Uneasy Peace with Academe, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 29, 1988, at A3.
33. "Almost all of the principals of the group came to maturity during the late sixties
or early seventies. Most began teaching during these years as well, often after a
stint in legal services or some other reform-oriented post, as well as participation
in the antiwar movement. And while dreams of reform faded, the common poli-
tics did not; indeed, many of the principals often moved farther left in an attempt
to explain what had gone wrong with earlier great hopes." John H. Schlegel,
Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Confer-
ence on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REv. 391, 406-07 (1984)(citations
omitted).
34. A quote attributed to Ivan Boesky, Wall Street takeover expert caught and sen-
tenced for using inside information. An Insider Goes Inside, WASH. POST., Jan. 3,
1988, at 27.
35. "Law is conceived to be the instrument of ideology, the ideology of the ruling
class, and it is the legal scholar's duty to demystify it, exposing rhetoric as sham
and putative truths as spurious." DAVID LEHmAN, SIGNS OF T"HE TsS: DECON-
STRUCTION AND THE FALL OF PAUL DE MAN 38 (1991).
36. Feminists argue that the ostensible "objectivity" of traditional scholarship serves
as a facade to give the appearance of an evenhanded system so as to maintain the
status quo of oppression of women. Ann 0. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist
Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1377-78 (1986).
37. The former dean of Yale Law School, Harry Wellington, complains that "law
professors today are more concerned with intellectual currents among their col-
leagues in the arts and sciences and less concerned about law practice and the
[Vol. 74:479
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yers and judges."3 8 They are sympathetic to the politics of diversity
and multiculturalism that burns within the university loop.39 As a
result, they want to incorporate these values into their work instead of
rehashing existing material. The new generation aspires to be "inno-
vators rather than imitators."4 0
Some professors look to the interdisciplinary method as a para-
digm for innovation. Using this paradigm, they seek to move closer to
other disciplines by minimizing the law input. New fields like "law
and literature,"4 1 "popular legal culture,"42 and deconstruction,43
have minimal contact with "law."
The crits were the first group to openly bend scholarship to ideol-
ogy.44 To them, traditional scholarship's only function is to validate
the big lie that law is objective, neutral, and rational.4 5 By attacking
traditional scholarship and the liberal white male establishment, the
output of the bench." John Metaxas, Two Justices, Self Congratulation Mark
Harvard Anniversary Bash, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 4. He subsequently
wrote that they "do not venture outside the ivory-covered walls, scorn the practic-
ing lawyer and his work... and look for rewards only from within the universi-
ties." Harry Wellington, Challenges to Legal Education: The "Two Culture"
Phenomenon, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 327, 329 (1987).
Judge Harry T. Edwards says: "Too many law professors are ivory tower dil-
ettantes. .. ." Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Edu-
cation and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 36 (1992).
38. Francis A. Allen, Legal Scholarship: Present Status and Future Prospects, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 403, 404 (1983). "Divisions between practitioners of the new schol-
arship and the profession are duplicated within law-school faculties and between
the faculties of different law schools." Id.
39. For coverage of what one writer calls the victim's revolution on campus, see
DINESH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLrrICs OF RACE AND SEX ON CAl-
Pus 1-23 (1991). See generally CHRuLEs SYKEs, Tm HoLLow MEN: POLITICS AN
CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1990)(discussing the crisis in higher educa-
tion and focusing on its impact upon Dartmouth College).
40. Posner, supra note 25, at 772.
41. See, e.g., Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in
the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARv. L.
REv. 384 (1985).
42. "Finally, the study of popular legal culture has another major virtue-it promises
to be fun. I think what lay people think lawyers do day to day is at least as
interesting as legal rules. We may choose to put aside our latest issue of the
Harvard Law Review, or even, for that matter, the Yale Law Journal, and watch
an episode of L4.A Law. As I have said before, ' p]erhaps, best of all, I no longer
need feel guilty as I watch the Badgers, Bucks, Brewers, and Packers struggle
with so little success. It's not wasting time. It's research.'" Stewart Macaulay,
Popular Legal Culture: An Introduction, 98 YALE L.J. 1545, 1558 (1989)(foot-
notes omitted).
43. See Arthur Austin, A Primer on Deconstruction's '-Rhapsody of Word-Plays," 71
N.C. L. REv. 201 (1992); JOHN ELLis, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989).
44. For the most balanced and thorough treatment of the CLS movement, see AN-
DREW ALTMrAN, CRITICAL LEGAL SUmiEs: A LIBERAL CRrrTQUE (1990).
45. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
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crits seek to debunk this "myth."46 The style is subjective, ideological,
and sometimes infantile.47 Professing to practice deconstruction,48
crits revel in "the indeterminacy of all texts, all writing."49 The favor-
ite tactic is what they call "trashing": "Take specific arguments very
seriously in their own terms; discover they are actually foolish ([tragi]-
comic); and then look for some (external observer's) order (not the
germ of truth) in the internally contradictory, inherent chaos we've
exposed."5 0
The most extreme advocates and practitioners of nontraditional
scholarship are feminists and members of the Racial Critique Theory
movement. Like the crits, they seek to subvert the liberal white male
establishment's control of legal education. Feminists attack the pres-
ence and effects of patriarchy while the Racial Critique people attack
various forms of racial oppression. They agree that the establishment
uses the "Tyranny of Objectivity"51 to maintain power by preserving
the status quo.5 2
Legal feminism is rooted in the broadbased political movement 53
and seeks drastic changes in legal education and law.54 These aspira-
tions are reflected in advocacy writing with no pretense of balance.55
Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon do not, for example,
mince their biases.5 6 Presenting a balance of views is objectivity and
thus something to be avoided.
46. CLS has become the main issue at many law schools, dividing faculty and stu-
dents. See generally Ken Emerson, When Legal Titans Clash, N.Y. Tnzs, April
22, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 26 (exploring the rift at Harvard Law School).
47. This, then is our challenge. To put ourselves on the line, to engage in acts of
'macho self-immolation,' to become moral terrorists, to 'whack-off' in faculty
meetings, to construct a praxis which is meaningful, public, and dangerous."
David Fraser, If I Had a Rocket Launcher: Critical Legal Studies or Moral Ter-
rorism, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 804 (1990). See also Guyora Binder, On Critical
Legal Studies as Guerrilla Warfare, 76 GEo. L.J. 1 (1987).
48. See Austin, supra note 43.
49. LEHMAN, supra note 35, at 38.
50. Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984)(emphasis in original).
See Alan D. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1229 (1981)(presenting a general defense of the values of trashing).
51. Scales, supra note 36, at 1376-80.
52. "In contrast, outsider scholarship is characterized by a commitment to the inter-
ests of people of color and/or women, by rejection of abstraction and dispassionate
'objectivity .... " Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Sto-
ries, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 683, 685 (1992).
53. Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. Rav. 617, 622 (1990).
54. Robin West argues that women are totally excluded from male jurisprudence.
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. Rv. 1, 58-60 (1988).
55. See Kenneth Lasson, Feminism Awry: Excesses in the Pursuit of Rights and Tri-
fies, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1992).
56. To Dworkin, all intercourse is rape. "Physically, the woman in intercourse is a
space inhabited, a literal territory occupied literally: occupied even if there has
[Vol. 74:479
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The rejection of the objective neutral model is based on the "voice"
assumption: women's experiences and perspectives are manifest in
the different voice of empathy, caring, and nurturing.57 Unlike men,
who rely on deduction, induction, analogy, and other traditional re-
search and scholarship methods, women can exploit their unique intu-
itive talents.58 This is the preface that feminists use to explain why
their scholarship is expressed in a different voice.59 The scholarship
voice can be subjective or personal and can be expressed in poetry,
stories, or other combinations. "Passion," "sorrow," and "anger" are
characteristic of feminist voice scholarship.60
Like the feminists, the Racial Critique Theory people profess to
speak in a different voice that is derived from their race experiences. 61
They took the voice assumption to another level, the level of exclusiv-
ity. "[T]he voice of color is identified and synonymous with marginal-
ized groups in our society whose marginal outside status enables them
to relate important stories-stories that cannot be sincerely told by
their privileged majoritarian peers."62
Hence, both groups claim to get special insights from status as vic-
tims or outsiders.63 Outsiders "encompass various outgroups, includ-
ing women, people of color, poor people, gays and lesbians, indigenous
Americans, and other oppressed people who have suffered historical
been no resistance, no force; even if the occupied person said yes please, yes
hurry, yes more." ANDREA Dwoiux, INTERCOURSE 133 (1987).
57. The boilerplate reference for this is CAROL GILUGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoIcE: PSY-
cHOLOGIcAL THEORY AND WoAmN's DEvLOPHNT (1982). See Joan M. Shaugh-
nessy, Gilligan's Travels, 7 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 3-5 (1988).
58. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829 (1990).
59. "Feminist work has thus named the power of naming and has challenged both the
use of male measures and the assumption that women fail by them." Martha
Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARv. L. Rv. 10, 61 (1987).
60. Coombs, supra note 52, at 713 n.120.
61. See Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "White-Male"Standards: Some Les-
sons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065 (1991); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.,
Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991
DUKE L.J. 39; Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Scholarly Paradigms: A New Tradition
Based on Context and Color, 16 VT. L. REv. 913 (1992); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The
New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Criti-
ques of Legal Academia, 102 Hnv. L. REv. 1745 (1989).
62. Johnson, New Voice, supra note 61, at 2038. Professor Matsuda recommends a
"new epistemological source for critical scholars: the actual experience, history,
culture, and intellectual tradition of people of color in America." Mari J. Mat-
suda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 325 (1987).
63. "Victim" is a status that carries political entitlements. See CHAIMns J. SYEs, A
NATION OF Viamnis: THE DECAY OF THE AmRICAN CHARACTER (1992).
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underrepresentation and silencing in the law schools."64 Their per-
spective is that of an alienated and excluded underclass. 65
IV. THE "OUTSIDER" STORYTELLER: "A NEW GENRE OF
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP66
Various forms of legal storytelling have been around for years in
the form of hypotheticals, problems, and war stories of "real" exper-
iences. 67 In addition, fictional narratives date back at least to The
Senior Partner's Ghost by Louis Auchincloss.68 It was Derrick Bell
who used these "stepping stones" 69 to publish the first "outsider" nar-
rative in 1985.70 In the Chronicles, Bell created Geneva Crenshaw, a
forceful Black woman who described four fantasies which she and her
visitor-presumably Bell-analyzed. Each fantasy concerns a racial
conflict.71 "In this new approach, Professor Bell has succeeded in us-
ing imagery and metaphors to address the very real problems
presented by contemporary racism." 72
Outsiders argue that storytelling is an effective way to attack and
expose what they view as a coerced objectivity, rationality, and neu-
64. Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in
Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 1, 1 n.2 (1988).
65. See Melissa Harrison, A Time of "Passionate Learning": Using Feminism, Law,
and Literature to Create a Learning Community, 60 TENN. L. Rv. 393 (1993);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MiAM L. REV. 29 (1987). One prominent
activist refuses to accept outsider status:
I resent the way in which the term 'underclass' is now insinuating itself
into scholarship, encountering very little critical resistance. You are
talking about my sisters and brothers. I know that if not for a few his-
torically accidental occurrences here and there, I might have been
among those so arrogantly labeled 'the underclass.'
Angel Y. Davis, Keynote Address, 43 STANq. L. REv. 1175, 1179 (1991).
66. Patricia Meisol, A New Genre of Legal Scholarship, BALTIMoRE SUN, Oct. 7, 1988,
Part V, at 8.
67. See Sandra Craig McKenzie, Storytelling: A Different Voice for Legal Education,
41 KAN. L. REv. 251 (1992).
68. Louis Auchincloss, The Senior Partner's Ghost, 50 V. L. REv. 195 (1964). See
infra notes 230-69 and accompanying text.
69. Arthur D. Austin, Narrative Writing as Legal Scholarship: An Interview with
Derrick Bell, IN BR=F, Sept. 1992, at 3 (Case Western Reserve University School
of Law Alumni Bull.)
70. Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chroni-
cles, 99 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1985). Bell has used the narrative technique in two
books: AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THa ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987),
and FACES AT THE BOTToM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992).
71. For further discussion of Bell's work see infra notes 253-55 and accompanying
text.
72. Leland Ware, Some Reflections on the Chronicles, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 407, 407
(1990).
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trality derived from patriarchal values. 7 3 "The stories of outgroups
aim to subvert that in group reality."74 In addition, stories are an "an-
tidote" to the abstraction of traditional scholarship.7 5 "Where we cele-
brate the specific and the personal, the law tells stories about
disembodied 'reasonable men.' "76 Narratives can give "significance to
emotion."7 7 The most common practice is to describe-or narrate-an
actual or fictional experience.
The objective is to use experiences in order to personalize the ef-
fects of establishment tactics on outsiders. "Experience narratives"
typically describe incidents in which a prevailing rule, custom, or
practice marginalizes women or minorities.78 The story uncovers the
psychological, economic, and social effect of the dominant white male
system on the narrator.7 9 Ideally, stories "transform" the views of
privileged insiders to the level of tolerance and understanding.SO
V. IS THE AALS COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION
PRACTICAL?
Nontraditional storytelling scholarship is now the accepted method
of expression by a growing number of young professors. It is embraced
by "mainstream" law reviews for the sake of balance or ideology.S1 Al-
73. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2073
(1989).
74. Richard Delgado, Storytelling For Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narra-
tive, 87 MxcH. L. REv. 2411, 2413 (1989).
75. "Stories supply both the individualized context and the emotional aspect missing
from most legal scholarship." Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Sto-
ries Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STA. L. REv. 807, 811
(1993).
76. Charles R. Lawrence, HI, The Word and the River: Pedagogy As Scholarship As
Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231, 2278-79 (1992).
77. Shauna Van Praagh, Stories in Law School: An Essay on Language, Participa-
tion, and the Power of Legal Education, 2 CoLUm. J. OF GENDER & L. 111, 114
(1992).
78. Abrams calls this "first-person agony narrative." Abrams, supra note 14, at 1021.
"In agony narratives the author reveals a painful experience-often one whose
exposure is interdicted by social taboos-in order to challenge the unap-
prehended harm inflicted by a practice or rule." Id.
79. "As a general proposition, I take the position that legal scholarship is not feminist
unless it is grounded in women's experience, an experience which produces a fem-
inist point of view." Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IowA L.
Rev. 19, 20 (1991).
80. Farber & Sherry, supra note 75, at 824. "The broadest claims credit stories with
substantial ideological power through which they either 'constitute' a community
of outsiders or transform the viewpoints of insiders." Id.
81. See Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically Correct Law Reviews (forthcoming
UTAH L. REV.).
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ternative journals have been created to cater to the new voices.82
Thus, while traditional scholarship is still the dominant method and
its practitioners control the promotion window, the new generation is
making a serious challenge.
When faculties confront the challenge they will debate three is-
sues. One, should storytelling be given parity with traditional schol-
arship? Two, assuming a positive response to the parity issue, what
are the relevant criteria for determining merit? Three, should the "ex-
clusivity" assertion be accepted?
A. The Parity Issue
1. Effect on University Relationship
A decision to grant storytelling parity with traditional scholarship
could have critical ramifications on an important relationship. Parity
could adversely affect the reputation of the law school within the uni-
versity culture-including administrators who control promotion, ten-
ure, and salary.
The autonomy law schools once enjoyed no longer exist. It is not
unusual to have promotion recommendations reversed by the central
administration. 83 Moreover, as a new member of the academic club,
law faculty are viewed with suspicion and jealousy.8 4 Other faculty
resent what they consider inflated law school salaries.85 Law schools
are viewed by many as trade schools who teach "how to do it" skills.8 6
Some respect has been achieved in recent years but it is a fragile rela-
tionship that could be ruined by a proparity decision that could be in-
terpreted as tolerating irrelevant writing or perhaps even anti-
intellectual work. Many nontraditional writers are already sensitive
to this risk; they write traditional work to get tenure and then have
82. See Mike Antoline, The New Law Reviews: A Burst of Specialty Alternatives, STU-
DENT LAw., May 1989, at 26; Legal Publications: A New Growth Industry, N.Y.
Tnnms, Aug. 19, 1988, at B5.
83. A growing number of universities around the country have restricted the
power of law faculty governance in matters of tenure on the basis of a
fear of laxity of standards, particularly with regard to scholarly accom-
plishment. As this University enters a new era, the Law School must
maintain its tradition of responsibility and excellence if it is to justifiably
retain the confidence of the University's administration.
AALS Report, supra note 18, at 489. See also Ken Myers, Decisions on Personnel
at Pitt Prompt Staff and Student Protest, NAT'L L.J., June 7, 1993, at 4 (decision
of tenured faculty overruled by provost).
84. See Entin, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
85. See Ken Myers, Law Profs: Poor No More Pay Is Up, NATL L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at
1.
86. -The primary orientation of their work remains teaching and the preparation of
casebooks or law-review articles that are useful for teaching or that are directed
to practitioners, judges among them." David Riesman, The Law School: Critical
Scholarship vs. Professional Education, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 110, 115 (1982).
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fun.8 7 But still there is the issue of salary raises and other perqs that
come after tenure.
The risk and the dilemma are produced by the brute and irreduci-
ble fact that nontraditional storytelling rejects the conventions of the
basic tenets of academic scholarship. Serious scholars revere analysis
and objectivity. To them, subjective advocacy posturing is best left to
the National Enquirer.88 Bias is a form of fraud. Put together a pro-
motion and tenure review committee of an economist, engineer, an
M.D. from the Medical School, and conjure their reaction to a file of
storytelling articles from a law professor. "After all, we all know that
perspectives come and go, but scholarship must forever look like
scholarship."89
There is another hurdle lurking in the underbrush of storytelling.
Footnoting, a sacred trust of scholarship, has been politicized.9 0 To
the traditional scholar, footnotes reference supporting research and
tell the reader where to go for amplification.91 To the nontraditional-
ist writer, footnoting is a subtle ploy to maintain the status of liberal
87. When I began teaching law in the mid-1970s, I was told by a number of
well-meaning senior colleagues to "play things straight" in my scholar-
ship-to establish a reputation as a scholar in some mainstream legal
area and not get too caught up in civil rights or other "ethnic" subjects.
Being young, impressionable, and anxious to succeed, I took their advice
to heart and, for the first six years of my career, produced a steady
stream of articles, book reviews, and the like, impeccably traditional in
substance and form. The dangers my friends warned me about were
averted; the benefits accrued. Tenure securely in hand, I turned my at-
tention to civil rights law and scholarship.
Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. Rav. 561, 561 (1984). See also Coombs, supra note 52, at
690.
88. The controversy over the nomination of Lani Guinier to head the civil rights divi-
sion involved charges that her writings were "advocacy" and therefore not real
scholarship. "Mere eccentricity or arrogance can shade into corruption where 'ad-
vocacy scholarship' is concerned." Mary Ann Glendon, What's Wrong with the
Elite Law Schools, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1993, at A16.
89. Michael Pacanowsky, Slouching Towards Chicago, 74 Q.J. OF SPEECH 453, 456
(1988)(a story about storytelling as scholarship).
90. See Arthur Austin, Political Correctness Is a Footnote, 71 OR. L. REv. 543 (1992).
91. "A legal citation serves two purposes. First, it indicates the nature of the author-
ity upon which a statement is based. Second, it contains the information neces-
sary to find and read the cited material." Paul Axel-Lute, Legal Citation Form:
Theory and Practice, 75 L. Lia. J. 148, 148 (1982).
A citation is a means "for the interested reader to test the conclusions of the
writer and to verify the source of a challengeable statement. As Louis Gottschalk
suggests, the footnote thus takes the place of the summons to a witness in a court
of law." Carolyn 0. Frost, The Use of Citations in Literary Research: A Prelimi-
nary Classification of Citation Functions, 49 LmR. Q. 399,400 (1979)(citing Louis
GorscHALx, UNDERSTANDING HISTORY: A PumIER OF HISTORICAL METHOD 19
(1950)).
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white male scholars. 92 As a feminist wrote: "I hate to rely on a dead
white man to illustrate this, but I like his weird clarity."93 They
counter with affirmative action in footnoting. To the "affirmative ac-
tion scholar... citing outsider scholarship is a political act."94 This is
a mindset that would not impress our committee of engineers, M.D.'s,
and economists.
2. The Paradigm Argument
Shrewd "counter tradition" scholars rely on Thomas Kuhn to ra-
tionalize their work and to respond to criticism.95 He teaches, at least
according to the accepted interpretation of outsiders, that science pro-
gresses in vast conceptual jumps instead of in a steady linear progres-
sion. Kuhn calls the results of the jumps paradigms. Paradigms are
always subject to erosion and change and it is the marketplace of opin-
ion, not scientific judgment, that determines the controlling perspec-
tive.96 As "a canned footnote,"97 Kuhn is used to support the
proposition that nontraditional writing is a new paradigm.98 Most im-
portantly, as a new paradigm, it automatically deserves recognition
and full acceptance as scholarship.99
92. As is the Bluebook. "In these rules, I see hierarchy, rigidity, and depersonaliza-
tion. .. ." Bartlett, supra note 58, at 829 n.*.
93. Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L.
REv. 139, 154 (1990).
94. Matsuda, supra note 64, at 5. Professor Delgado made footnotes a political issue
in Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, supra note 87. Two feminists advocate race
identification of authors. Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The Leg-
acy of Doubt: Treatment of Sex and Race in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1367, n.* (1992).
95. ThomS S. KUHN, Th STRucTuRE OF Sc NT C REVOLUTIONS (1970).
96. A shift in a paradigm is precipitated by a scientific "crisis" in which existing rules
cannot solve emerging "puzzles." "[Riecognized anomalies whose characteristic
feature is their stubborn refusal to be assimilated to existing paradigms." Id. at
97. The next step is a "revolution" in which an alternate paradigm competes with
existing paradigms for support within the community. "Conversions will occur a
few at a time until, after the last holdouts have died, the whole profession will
again be practicing under a single, but now a different, paradigm." Id. at 152.
97. Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515,
1539 n.93 (1991).
98. Those who argue that the paradigm process is applicable to other fields, including
law, can point to some suggestive comments by Kuhn:
"Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between com-
peting paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of commu-
nity life." KUHN, supra note 95, at 94.
"As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice-there is no standard
higher than the assent of the relevant community." Id.
"There must also be a basis, though it need be neither rational nor ultimately
correct, for faith in the particular candidate chosen." KUHN, supra note 95, at
158.
99. Johnson argues that two scholarship paradigms can co-exist: a "neutral, objec-
tive evaluative paradigm" for traditional scholarship and a "supplementary con-
[Vol. 74:479
EVALUATING STORYTELLING
At first impression, they have a plausible "new paradigm" argu-
ment. The code words of the old scholarship paradigm-analysis, ra-
tionality, objectivity, and neutrality-are irrelevant to law under the
new paradigm. Why not "altruism" in place of "individualism?loo
What is wrong with empathy instead of patriarchy?1o1 As subjects of
the nontraditional scholarship, these new principles are the essence of
the emerging new paradigm of voice expression. A paradigm shift is
in flow; the paradigm of traditional scholarship is being ousted by the
new paradigm of nontraditional writing-including storytelling. And,
according to Kuhn, when a new paradigm appears, "there are usually
significant shifts in the criteria determining the legitimacy both of
problems and of proposed solutions."10 2
There is just one problem with the paradigm shift argument-it
wilts under a close reading of Kuhn.l03 Despite "suggestive" com-
textual evaluative paradigm" for color-voice scholarship. Johnson, Scholarly
Paradigms, supra note 61.
On the other hand, when the scholar of color speaks to any racial
issue, such as affirmative action, no one can predict that she may see
and evaluate that issue differently than her majoritarian colleagues.
Her viewpoint will be greatly informed as a result of her different exper-
iences in our society as a person of color. The neutral, consensus-driven
paradigm for evaluating such scholarship is too narrowly circumscribed
to evaluate the merit and worth of the work of scholars of color when
speaking in the voice of color. A new paradigm must be employed-one
that recognizes the existence and the worth of the voice of color. This
new paradigm must not supplant, but must supplement the
majoritarian paradigm.
Id. at 921.
Abrams also raises a paradigm argument: "In this context, the criteria de-
rived from the premise of objectivity remain one paradigm for evaluation-no
doubt, at this point, the dominant paradigm. But they are no longer regarded as
so unproblematic that feminist scholars must respond to them as the single
means of validating our claims." Abrams, supra note 14, at 1015.
100. This is Duncan Kennedy's argument. See Kennedy, supra note 45.
101. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal
Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 61 (1988).
102. KUHN, supra note 95, at 109.
103. While outsider authors nonchalantly refer to Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, it is invariably without explanation as to precisely how it supports
the arguments in the text. In fact, his book is complicated and difficult to parse.
For example, Margaret Masterman reads Kuhn as using paradigm "in not less
than twenty-one different senses in [1962], possibly more, not less." Margaret
Masterman, The Nature of a Paradigm, in CR IIs AND THE GRowTH OF KNOWL-
EDGE 59, 61 (Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave eds., 1970).
This accounts for the criticism that Kuhn is "relativistic."
Rather, I have tried to show, such relativism, while it may seem to be
suggested by a half-century of deeper study of discarded theories, is a
logical outgrowth of conceptual confusions, in Kuhn's case owing primar-
ily to the use of a blanket term. For his view is made to appear convinc-
ing only by inflating the definition of "paradigm" until that term becomes
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ments indicating a broader scope,1O4 his interest was exclusively in
science. Kuhn's paradigm is concerned with scientific problem solv-
ing, i.e. what he saw as a crisis in puzzle solving. During the para-
digm "revolution," nothing is arbitrary; instead everyone in the
community is trying to solve anomalies. No solutions, no para-
digm.105 "But if a paradigm is ever to triumph it must gain some first
supporters, men who will develop it to the point where hardheaded
arguments can be produced and multiplied."106 Moreover, a paradigm
occurs only when there is a total consensus among the affected scien-
tific community.10 7 Most importantly, in a Postscript to The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn disavowed making science "rest on
unanalyzable individual intuitions rather than on logic and law."10
In a latter paper he settled the issue: "My methodological prescription
is, however, directed exclusively to the sciences and, among them, to
those fields which display the special developmental pattern known as
so vague and ambiguous that it cannot easily be withheld, so general
that it cannot easily be applied, so mysterious that it cannot help ex-
plain, and so misleading that it is a positive hindrance to the under-
standing of some central aspects of science; and then, finally, these
excesses must be counterbalanced by qualifications that simply contra-
dict them.
Dudley Shapere, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 73 TnE PHIL. REv. 383,
393 (1964).
104. See KUHN, supra note 95.
105. "But the sign of Kuhnian consensus is not just some sort of general endorsement
of a super-theory but an acceptance that is so strong it eliminates the need for
further discussion of foundational questions about the subject-matter and meth-
odology of the disciplines and enables the discipline to devote most of its energy to
puzzle-solving. A consensus that does not have this character will not be suffi-
cient to sustain the practice of Kuhnian normal science; and it is this practice
that is the mark of a mature science. The very existence of so many attempts by
social scientists to use Kuhn's work to arrive at a basic understanding of what is
going on in their disciplines shows that they have no consensus in Kuhn's sense."
GARY GUTtING, Introduction to PARADIGMS AND IREVOLUTIONS: APPRAISALs AND
APPLICATIONS OF THOMAS KUmS's PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 13 (Gary Gutting ed.,
1980).
106. KuHN, supra note 95, at 158. Moreover, "the new paradigm must promise to pre-
serve a relatively large part of the concrete problem-solving ability that has ac-
crued to science through its predecessors." Id. at 169. The feminists, crits, and
race theorists do not envision any elements of the liberal white male system
surviving.
107. GUTrING, supra note 105. Kuhn rejects the criticism that he is a relativist.
KuHN, supra note 95, at 205-07.
108. KUHN, supra note 95, at 191 (Postscript). "Though scientific development may
resemble that in other fields more closely than has often been supposed, it is also
strikingly different." Id. at 209.
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progress."109 Moreover, whatever the interpretation of Kuhn, science
is still viewed from within as cumulative.11o
Despite Langdell's efforts,11 law is not a science and is thus not
amenable to the puzzle solving imperatives of Kuhm's paradigM.112
Nevertheless, the notion of paradigm has relevance for analogy pur-
poses. Like sociology, law can use the paradigm to provide perspec-
tives. "When used by sociologists, however, the term comes most often
to mean no more than a general theoretical perspective, or even.., a
collection of elements from several more or less distinct perspec-
tives."113 In a legal scholarship context, narratives do not serve as
puzzle solvers, instead they illuminate tensions, expose the politics of
the establishment, and serve as a counter to traditional scholar-
ship.114 These consequences of narrative constitute a new tradition
and hence can co-exist with other forms of conventional legal
scholarship.115
Moreover, it is better, as a matter of academic tactics, to accommo-
date the new scholarship: give in on parity and avoid the complaints
about oppression and victimization of outsiders that would further
109. Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in Carrics AND Tm GROWTH OF
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 103, at 231, 243 (emphasis added). For further confirma-
tion see THors S. KUHN, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in Tim STRuCTURE OF
SciENmic THmorms 459 (Frederick Suppe ed., 1977).
110. Fields of science, I have suggested, make progress in broadly cumulative
fashion. As those fields progress, scientists come to employ cognitive
strategies that are superior, when judged by versions of the external
standard. Despite the existence of periods in which alternative ways of
revising practice can be defended by equally good arguments, scientific
communities typically resolve these indeterminacies by articulating a
superior form of reasoning that can be used to support one of the rivals.
PHLI KrrCHER, THE ADVANCEirNT OF SCIENCE 387-88 (1993).
111. 'The fact seems to be that this was an extremely early attempt to apply the in-
ductive method of the laboratory to matters foreign to the natural sciences." Eu-
gene Wambaugh, Professor Langdell-A View of His Career, 20 HARV. L. Rsv. 1, 2
(1906).
112. "Law, after all, is not religion, not physics, and not just an applied social science.
Law is law." RoBERT S. SMsmERS, INSTRumENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THE-
ORY 271 (1982).
113. Douglas L. Eckberg & Lester Hill, Jr., The Paradigm Concept and Sociology: A
Critical Review, in PARADiGms AND REvOLUTIONs, supra note 105, at 117, 122.
114. Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46
VAND. L. REv. 665, 666 (1993).
115. Puzzle-solving, unlike aesthetic judgment, is the unique province of spe-
cially trained practitioners; and the aesthetic qualities of an artistic
achievement remain even after the puzzle-solutions (if any) that pro-
duced it have become irrelevant. Kuhn offers a similar explanation of
differences in the way art and science develop through time; e.g., in art
successful revolutions mean the acceptance of new traditions but gener-
ally not (as in science) the abandonment of older traditions; and as a
result art but not science characteristically gives simultaneous support
to incompatible traditions.
GuTGI, supra note 105, at 17.
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splinter the academy. With the increasingly strong pressure for polit-
ical correctness in law schools, it is an inevitable concession.1 16 The
critical issue is what standard would be used to evaluate nontradi-
tional scholarship. This is where the battle should be fought.
B. Exclusivity
According to the exclusivity argument, the oppression of feminists
and minorities by the liberal white male system has given them a
unique sensitivity. As the objects of oppression, they have acquired
the exclusive credentials to present their stories and experiences-
which have "been silenced in traditional legal scholarship."117 The
dominant language of traditional scholarship is manipulated to "lock
out" minority groups.1 1 8 Whatever they say about oppression is enti-
tled to a presumption of expertise. 1' 9 There is another presumption:
only those who are within the victimization loop can determine the
credibility-the sincerity-of oppression writing.12 0 Professor Regina
Austin suggests that it would be a further extension of dominance if
white males engaged in storytelling.12 1
Professor Williams relies on the Black experience to justify exclu-
sivity. To her, Black "experiences of the same circumstances may be
116. See Steven C. Bahls, Political Correctness and the American Law School, 69
WASH. U. L.Q. 1041, 1044 (1991); David P. Bryden, It Ain't What They Teach, It's
the Way that They Teach It, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1991, at 38, 44; Arlynn L.
Presser, The Politically Correct Law School: Where It's Right to be Left, A.BA. J.,
Sept. 1991, at 52-53; Michael Weiss, Feminist Pedagogy in the Law Schools, ACA-
DEMIC QUESTIONS, Summer 1992, Vol. 5, No. 3, at 75.
117. Stephanie B. Goldberg, The Law, a New Theory Holds, Has a White Voice, N.Y.
TIEs, July 17, 1992, at BS.
118. Benita Ramsey, Introduction, Excluded Voices: Realities in Law and Reform, 42
U. MIAm L. REV. 1, 2 (1987). "By manipulating language to create self-serving
labels for social conditions, the elite ignore the repressive conditions under which
society's less influential groups suffer." Id.
119. Delgado, supra note 87, at 564 n.15.
120. See supra notes 61 and 62 and accompanying text.
121. On the capacity and propriety of white males to evaluate black anti-oppression
scholarship, Regina Austin recommends "wariness."
Given the dearth of work by any one reflecting a black feminist jurispru-
dence, an extended answer to the question would be premature. At this
point, I would only emphasize that the subject is scholarship, not report-
age. Self-awareness and self-criticism are required of all who do it.
Adopting a black feminist perspective would require that white male
scholars criticize the white supremacist and partriarchial thinking that
are the sources of their superior status. Moreover, because white male
scholars have the capacity to dominate any area of iniquity they share
with minority academics, see Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections
on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. Rlv. 561 (1984),
they have the capacity to dilute whatever counter ideological impact
black feminist scholarship might have. For these reasons, wariness is in
order.
Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539, 543 n.14.
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very, very different1 2 2 from white perceptions and "the same symbol
may mean different things to each of us."12 3 It is her experiences of
racial putdown, invisibility, and exclusion, that give Williams and
other Black writers exclusive dominion over "stories." How could a
white male colleague write about never-experienced experiences, com-
prehend the subtle nuances of racism, or determine the merit of the
story?' 24 Professor Johnson says:
Indeed, I contend that white males do not employ the narrative, story-
telling style because to do so would result in their talking about their domi-
nance and that currently is not socially acceptable discourse. Also, to
emphasize their dominance and dominant position would demonstrate the
fact that the meritocracy they believe in is not really a trhe meritocracy, but
rather a system providing them with built-in advantages. 12 5
Recognizing the obvious, Johnson subsequently conceded that
storytelling is ubiquitous to all cultures, races, and ethnic groups. 12 6
He also conceded that "someone other than a person of color should be
able to speak in the Voice of Color given the right experience, learning,
or aptitude."127 But this is a vapor concession that does not give up
the exclusivity argument. When an insider writes narrative in the
Voice of Color, it is a "mimiic"128 or "affectation." Forrest Carter, a
pseudonym for a "Ku Klux Klan terrorist"129 may have fooled the crit-
ics and the public into believing the authenticity of the "autobiogra-
phy" of Little Tree,' 3 0 but it was merely the "equivalent of an
affectation that he used when it was to his advantage and discarded
122. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rmv. 401, 409 (1987). See Peter Monaghan, 'Criti-
cal Race Theory' Questions Role of Legal Doctrine in Racial Inequality, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., June 23, 1993, at A7.
123. Williams, supra note 122 (footnote omitted).
124. On this issue Professor Coombs takes an "agnostic" position, then waffles:
"though I think someone who has grown up conscious of her connections to an
outsider community can more easily develop the capacity for such scholarship."
Coombs, supra note 52, at 712 n.118.
125. See Johnson, New Voice, supra note 61, at 2047 n.170.
126. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the
Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship,
79 IowA L. REv. 803 (1994). "Euro-American scholars have used narrative for
many years and scholars of color trace their use of it to its use by Euro-American
scholars." Id. at 835.
127. Id. at 836.
128. Id. at 835 n.138.
129. Henry L. Gates, Jr., 'Authenticity,' or the Lesson of Little Tree, N.Y. TnmEs, Nov.
24, 1991, at 1, 26 (book review).
130. Foau Esr CARTEP, THM EDUCATION OF Lur TREE (1976). This was the autobiog-
raphy of Little Tree who, after being orphaned at age ten, was raised by his Cher-
okee grandparents in the hills of Tennessee. After being published by the
University of New Mexico in paperback, it became an instant hit, selling over
350,000 copies. Critics saw it as a "deeply felt" masterpiece "that captured the
unique vision of Native American culture." Gates, supra note 129, at 26.
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when it was not."131 Thus when insider scholars write in the Voice of
Color they are "impostors"132 producing "counterfeit" stories.133
Exclusivity in legal storytelling parallels a similar movement in lit-
erary criticism. Under the "ideology of authenticity,134 readers can
read a work and automatically detect an author's race or gender.
"There is an assumption that we could fill a room with the world's
great literature, train a Martian to analyze these books, and then ex-
pect that Martian to categorize each by the citizenship or ethnicity or
gender of its author."135 The assumption is based on author identity:
"[t]he works they create transparently convey the authentic, un-
mediated experience of their social identities ... ."136
Self-anointed exclusivity is the unilateral creation of power. A self
selected group appropriates the exclusive power to determine the ac-
ceptable criteria for evaluation. As a result, only outsiders are enti-
tled to make judgments on the quality of storytelling. This argument
is simply "implausible."137 Exclusivity is grounded in self-aggrandiz-
ing political goals that are unacceptable to entrenched scholarship
values. As Randall Kennedy says, it constitutes an "ongoing effort by
intellectuals of color to control the public image of minority groups
and to exercise leadership on their own behalf."138
The ethos of scholarship-in all fields-is inclusion rather than ex-
clusion. Scholars within fields speak a common language. There is, to
131. Johnson, supra note 126, at 836 n.146.
132. As a member of the majority group, Forrest Carter undoubtedly pos-
sessed some insights about what others like him wished to hear from
persons of color speaking in the Voice of Color. That insight could be
used to produce a Voice of Color that is attractive (some might say pa-
tronizing) to members of the majority group, but not so attractive to
members of the minority group apparently represented by impostors like
Forrest Carter.
Id. at 837 n.148.
133. At the very least, by speaking in a counterfeit Voice of Color Forrest
Carter accomplished a call to a perspective that requires the reader to
confront the author's alleged differentness and, in doing so, the white
race-consciousness that is implicit and endemic in this society. That is
not a total failure.
Id. at 837.
134. Gates, supra note 129, at 1. In history the parallel is the "doctrine of collective
ethnic experience" which assumes that race, sex, religion, or ethnic background
endows the members of that group "with unique insights or perceptions denied to
those outside the group." Theodore S. Hamerow, Point of View, CHRON. IGHER
EDUC., Aug. 4, 1993, at A36.
135. Gates, supra note 129.
136. Id. at 26. For a discussion of"privileged access to knowledge" under the sociology
of knowledge see Robert K. Merton, Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the
Sociology of Knowledge, 78 Am. J. Soc. 9 (1972); Joseph Agassi, Privileged Access,
12 Inquiry 420 (1969).
137. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 75, at 818.
138. Kennedy, supra note 61, at 1754.
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be sure, consensus on various points. But this consensus can only be
achieved by inclusion of challengers and must stand the scrutiny from
any source.1 3 9 The reason is obvious; without constant challenge
there can be no change and no additions to the "state of knowledge."
Artificial barriers to challenge and inquiry inhibit this process. "One's
racial (gender, religious, regional) identity is no substitute for the dis-
ciplined study essential to achieving expertise."' 40 Gates says, "No
human culture is inaccessible to someone who makes the effort to un-
derstand, to learn, to inhabit another world."141
Erecting a synthetic barrier around an academic theme by re-
jecting criticism and evaluation is a confession of a lack of confidence
or an admission of a barren intellectual terrain. What other reasons
could explain a demand for race or gender autonomy over scholarship?
When Professor Delgado demanded that liberal white males leave
civil rights scholarship to minorities, he was literally trying to elimi-
nate a big block of competition.' 42
Exclusivity for forms of race and gender writing can produce
counterproductive effects. It endorses Balkanization in scholarship
and in other areas of legal education. White males could make out a
case for exclusivity based on their voice of rationality and objectiv-
ity.143 "They" could argue for presumed expertise in areas like tax
and securities which have traditionally been considered "rational and
139. " Publish or perish!' is a fundamental psychological, indeed almost physiological,
imperative that is rooted in the very metabolism of scholarship as a vocation. For
that is how research remains honest, by exposing itself to the criticism and cor-
rection of other scholars and by inviting them-or daring them-to replicate its
results (if they can!) and, if possible, to carry those results further." Jaroslav
Pelikan, Scholarship: A Sacred Vocation, SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING, Oct. 1984, at
3, 19.
140. Kennedy, supra note 61, at 1777.
141. Gates, supra note 129, at 30.
142. The time has come for white liberal authors who write in the field of civil
rights to redirect their efforts and to encourage their colleagues to do so
as well. There are many other important subjects that could, and
should, engage their formidable talents. As these scholars stand aside,
nature will take its course; I am reasonably certain that the gap will
quickly be filled by talented and innovative minority writers and com-
mentators. The dominant scholars should affirmatively encourage their
minority colleagues to move in this direction, as well as simply make the
change possible.
Delgado, supra note 87, at 577.
143. But we must not forget that the doctrine of inherited cultural tradition is
a two-edged sword. It can be used to exclude just as easily as to include;
it can serve to discriminate as much as to liberate, perhaps more so.
Historically, it has been used to support hierarchy and elitism. By em-
ploying it as an instrument of democratization, we may be opening the
door to its application once again as a tool of oppression. The doctrine of
inherited cultural tradition might well be used anew to enforce elite val-
ues in higher education. Beware of it.
Hamerow, supra note 134.
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analytical." Blacks, females, white males, etc.-may have to negotiate
over who specializes and teaches in areas like contracts or tort.1 44
VI. EVALUATING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
There is no consensus on criteria for evaluating legal scholar-
ship.145 Professor Carter's experience is typical: "After nearly a dec-
ade of sitting through faculty meetings and listening to my colleagues
discussing scholarship, I am quite certain that there is no such animal
as the 'majoritarian perspective .. " -146 One reason for the lack of
consensus is that law academics do not have the benefit of a scholar-
ship tradition. Compared to other disciplines, legal scholarship is a
recent event, becoming a serious responsibility as recently as the
1970s. 14 7 This is compounded by the nagging and widespread doubt
among law professors that law is a field that can generate "real" schol-
arship.148 They self-consciously see law as a vocation in which the
primary purpose of law schools is to train people how to practice.1 4 9
The bulk of what we call research and scholarship is essentially a form
of advice to judges and lawyers on policy or interpretation. Authors
may produce new or different perspectives on interpretation, the ap-
plication of a statute, or the range of a precedent, but they cannot
solve puzzles like the scientist.150 Unlike the lawyer, the scientist is
challenged by the conviction that, "if only he is skilful enough, he will
succeed in solving a puzzle that no one before has solved or solved so
144. Feminists argue that they have been marginalized in contracts and torts. See
Bender, supra note 101, at 3; Nancy S. Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses:
Some Common Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101 (1988); Mary J. Frug, Re-Reading
Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065
(1985).
145. Julius Getman, The Internal Scholarly Jury, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 337, 337 (1989).
146. Carter, supra note 61, at 2075.
147. Elyce H. Zenoff & Lizebeth A. Moody, Law Faculty Attrition: Are We Doing Some-
thing Wrong? 36 J. LEGAL EDuc. 209, 220-21 (1986).
148. See supra articles collected in note 1. Harvard did not require publication until
1969. SELIGMAN, supra note 27. Distressed over the lack of quality, one professor
is quoted as saying: "I am not sure that we have reached the point where you
could jot something down on a cocktail napkin and get it published, but we're
close." Charles Rothfeld, A Lament: Too Few Interesting Law Articles, N.Y.
Tnms, Nov. 23, 1990, at B23.
149. American Bar Association, Legal Education and Professional Development-An
Educated Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profes-
sion: Narrowing the Gap, 1992 A.B.A. SEc. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS 1.
150. There is another problem haunting legal scholars-they publish in student ed-
ited journals devoid of a peer review system. See Austin, supra note 28. While
generally ignoring this problem, many faculty nevertheless agree that "student
edited journals are the scandal of legal publishing.... ."Patricia Gray, Harvard's
Faculty Stirs a Tempest With Plans for New Law Journal, N.Y. Tnvds, May 28,
1986, § 2, at 37.
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well."151 This may account for the lack of empirical research in law-
the foundation for puzzle solving.152
All of the above "dilemmas" push the evaluation theme into the
school of "I know it when I see it."-53 The AALS Report reflects this
position: "[sIchools typically state their expectations in terms like
these: [scholarship] should be sufficient... to demonstrate a devotion
to intellectual inquiry and scholarly production that indicates a prom-
ise of a continued intellectually inquiring mind and scholarly produc-
tivity throughout the person's professional life."154
The AALS Report favors what Racial Critique Theory considers
"majoritarian" criteria. "[T]here is a neutral, objective, evaluative
standard by which the 'best' scholarship can be ascertained, ranked,
differentiated from other works, and rewarded."155 This is what out-
siders label "meritocracy," a system of evaluation imposed by white
male scholars that is condemned by many Black scholars.156 Profes-
sor Carter, in turn, rejects dual race defined criteria; he proposes an
analogy to patentability requirements that would be helpful in accom-
modating nontraditional scholarship. He argues that it is not the
mode of scholarship that is relevant, but "what has resulted from the
particular mode that the scholar has selected for work."157 Merit is
determined by a two pronged test: "the argument must be new, mean-
ing that it has not been said before,"158 and the work must "increase
human knowledge ... ."159
While it has the advantage of simplicity, Carter's test is neverthe-
less demanding. If rigorously applied, the gates of promotion and ten-
ure would indeed be narrow and "would almost certainly exclude
much of existing traditional scholarship."160 Nevertheless, he makes
a valid point-we need something better than "I know it when I read
it." As Professor Rubin points out, without external guidelines, judg-
151. KuHN, supra note 95, at 38.
152. Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 323 (1989).
153. As a colleague once said: "If it is not in the last ten pages it is not there."
154. AALS Report, supra note 18, at 491.
155. Johnson, New Voice, supra note 61, at 2015.
156. Proponents of the Monistic dialect assert that their methodology is a dis-
tinctive way of approaching moral, legal, and social issues that embodies
racial consciousness, and that their legal scholarship and doctrine has
heretofore been marginalized. They argue that a dominant perspective
that professes cultural neutrality in fact represents cultural hegemony
of the majority-white males-and has ignored their insight.
Johnson, New Voice, supra note 61, at 2027.
157. Carter, supra note 61, at 2084.
158. Id. at 2085.
159. Id. at 2080.
160. Farber & Sherry, supra note 75, at 848.
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ments on scholarship devolves into a game of power and politics.161
On the other hand, "A theory of evaluation can become the unifying
element in legal scholarship ....- 162
A. Evaluation Under Rubin's Criteria
Professor Rubin relies on the critique of methodology which "be-
gins with the individual evaluator, and seeks to articulate the rules
which that particular person should employ, given her own position
and personal set of beliefs."163 The objective is to bring the evaluator
and author together on common ground.
The first Rubin criterion is that the author must describe the norm
that guides his work with "clarity."164 The next step is "persuasive-
ness": would readers be "convinced" if they accepted the author's
norm.16 5 Rubin separates-i.e., "distances"-the reviewer's norms
from the scholarship by putting the final judgment of persuasiveness
in the mind of a "rational public decisionmaker."166
Having addressed the decisionmaker as a reference for evalua-
tion,167 Rubin moves to the author's peers-scholars who are "onlook-
ers to the author's act of addressing legal decisionmakers.16s Peer
scholars are like an audience at a play, watching the "performance" of
the author. In this version of theater, the reviewer first looks for "sig-
nificance," i.e., "the manner in which the work relates to the unfolding
historical development of its academic field."169 The key questions are
whether the work is part of the development of a field and whether it
has impact. Finally, the work must add to the reviewer's "under-
standing." Rubin calls this "applicability": "the operative question is
whether the evaluator would apply the work or idea that it contains in
her own thinking process."170
161. Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship,
80 CAL. L. REv. 889, 894-902 (1992).
162. Id. at 902.
163. Id. at 909.
164. "The legal scholar can achieve understanding only by identifying his controlling
norms with clarity and by explaining their relationship to his specific argu-
ments." Id. at 915.
165. Id. at 919-20.
166. "The process of imagining how a different person, with different views, would
react produces a useful distance; it is a mode of self-discipline that is designed to
avoid, or at least dampen, the effect of opinion and bias in a situation where de-
finitive proofs are unavailable." Id. at 921.
167. "In applying this test for persuasiveness, it helps to recall that the explicit audi-
ence for a typical work of legal scholarship is a public decisionmaker." Id.
168. Id. at 925.
169. Id. at 928. "Is it in the field's mainstream, or on its advancing edge? Is it in a
side-eddy, a backwater, or entirely out the channel?" Id.
170. Id. at 935-37.
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Rubin's proposal is the most ambitious and detailed system of eval-
uation in the scholarship literature. He offers a process that can func-
tion to mediate bias and arbitrariness in judging the quality of
scholarship. An important byproduct is his analysis of the major prob-
lem areas in legal scholarship. Finally, Rubin goes on to provide
guides in evaluating nontraditional forms of scholarship-or what he
calls "complete" and "partial" subdisciplines.171
When nontraditional scholarship is at issue, the potential for bias
is more pronounced. Rubin suggests that this can be dealt with by the
reviewer assuming doubt ("a consciously adopted mindset)172 and
anxiety ("a response elicited by experience).173 Rubin wants the re-
viewer to reexamine his assumptions in order "to stand apart from it
... see it as merely one position among many."174 If the reviewed
work creates doubt and anxiety about the credibility of the reviewer's
assumptions, it must have value. 175
Yet having pursued the issue so thoroughly, Rubin stops at the
challenge of storytelling. He concludes that narrative is devoid of
methodological content:' 7 6
Explicit recognition of these experiences in legal scholarship, the willingness
to speak in an individual, rather than a depersonalized, objective voice, could
conceivably evolve into a separate method. But method, as discussed above,
consists of an interlinked set of consciously articulated procedures that gener-
ates research. To date, narrative has not developed to this point; it functions
as a specific technique for the presentation of substantive views, not as a com-
prehensive system that generates its own scholarly approach. It is not, for
example, equivalent to the deconstructive arguments that characterize critical
legal scholarship or to the microeconomic analysis of the Chicago School.1 7 7
171. Complete subdisciplines "possess a different ideology and a different methodol-
ogy." Id. at 947. Rubin puts law and economics and CLS in this Category. Id.
Law and economics assume the ideology of efficiency while CLS condemns pre-
vailing power distributions as unjust. Id. at 947-48. In partial subdiscliplines
the divergence from mainstream norms of ideology and methodology "is limited to
one category or the other." Id. at 953. Rubin includes law and literature (meth-
odology) and feminism and critical race theory (ideology) in this category. Id.
"These works are animated by norms that clearly diverge from those of main-
stream scholars." Id.
172. Id. at 945.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 946.
175. "hus, the very process of formulating counter-arguments which is a mechanism
for outright rejection of the author's work when uncritically performed, becomes a
datum for assessing that work's quality in the context of a more disciplined evalu-
ative theory." Id.
176. "A methodology is an interlinked set of consciously articulated procedures that
generates research and resolves substantive uncertainties in that subject." Id. at
899.
177. Id. at 955-56 (footnotes omitted).
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B. The Farber-Sherry Evaluation Standards
Farber and Sherry are the first non-outsiders to conduct an in
depth analysis of storytelling.178 After confronting some of the as-
sumptions made by outsiders, they conclude with a set of guidelines
for evaluating stories. 179 They start with the requirement that any
evaluation system must start with the "analytic component"' 80 which
includes "the core goals of legal scholarship."181 The first goal-"com-
prehensibility,... becomes much more difficult as it shades into ques-
tions about how readers understand the law-related point of the
story."182 Next comes the criterion of "originality."183
The authors express doubt that storytelling can satisfy these stan-
dards. For example, what can experiences add to one's knowledge if
one has suffered discrimination, and, if one has not, "stories are un-
likely to teach us."1 8 4 Likewise, narrative defies application of the
originality test: "Even if we limit our inquiry to the minimal standard
of 'add[ing] to the totality of knowledge' it will still prove difficult to
determine whether a particular narrative has had an additive ef-
fect."185 To them, personal experiences, standing alone without legal
analysis,186 cannot constitute good scholarship.187 They conclude:
"Although we have not found sufficient evidence to support strong ver-
sions of the "different voice" thesis, we do find weaker versions credi-
ble; we also conclude that legal stories, particularly those 'from the
178. Farber & Sherry, supra note 75.
179. They reject the assumption that Black and Feminist storytellers "speak in a
unique voice." Id. at 814, 818. The assumption that stories strengthen "commu-
nity" among outsiders does not "validate the stories as scholarship." Id. at 824.
The assumption that racial and gender attitudes of insiders can be transformed
by stories "seems implausible." Id. at 826. They reject the assumption that sto-
ries eliminate bias in the legal system "because the problems themselves stem
from broader social conditions." Id. at 828. "Moreover, there is reason to ques-
tion whether the personal stories of middle-class law professors can accurately
convey the perspectives of the truly disadvantaged." Id.
180. Id. at 846.
181. Id. at 847.
182. Id. at 848.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 849.
185. Id. at 848.
186. Personal narratives without the analytical component are immune to counter ar-
guments and thus defy an on-going dialogue. Id. at 850-51. The authors note
that, "at least in theory," it is possible "that a narrative could be effectively used
not only to convey concrete experience, but also to encode abstract arguments
which the reader could then analyze. On the whole, we are dubious about how
successfully this encoding can be achieved. In any event, while such narrative
would not explicitly provide analysis, it would effectively meet our requirement
that analysis be conveyed to the reader." Id. at 853.
187. The authors have a third criterion-significance or the importance of a work. They
do not have much to say on this point except: "It is ultimately a judgment about
how the scholarship will stand the test of time." Id. at 853-54.
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bottom,' can play a useful role in legal scholarship. Unlike some advo-
cates of storytelling, however, we see no reason to retreat from con-
ventional standards of truthfulness and typicality in assessing stories.
Nor do we see any reason to abandon the expectation that legal schol-
arship contain reason and analysis, as well as narrative. A legal story
without analysis is much like a judicial opinion with 'Findings of Fact'
but no 'Conclusions of Law.'1ss
C. Evaluation By Outsiders
The bulk of the writing on storytelling by outsiders describes its
origins, what it is, and what it does. Descriptions by people like Der-
rick Bell,189 Richard Delgado,190 and Patricia WilliamsL91 convey the
common theme that stories raise consciousness and serve as a vehicle
to educate insiders.19 2 Another theme is exclusivity; stories convey
the unique messages of Blacks and minorities.193
One implication of the unique message assumption is that the sto-
ries constitute scholarship by presence and source-i.e., the fact that
it is an outsider's story validates it as scholarship. As choreographers
of storytelling, outsiders own the right to define evaluation criteria.
This is consistent with the view that voice scholarship presumptively
conveys "expertise."19 4 Moreover, who can evaluate "experiences" bet-
ter than the author?19 5 Professor Coombs adopts this argument. She
accepts the notion that evaluation is important in "all scholarly com-
munities ... ."196 It is especially important that outsiders adopt crite-
ria so as to "insulate our work from the imposition of inappropriate
criteria developed by and for other scholarly communities, such as
traditional legal scholarship."'197 Coombs exults the passion and sub-
jectivity of outsider work,198 concluding that since outsider scholar-
ship is a "valid" form of scholarship, it is appropriate that those
insiders unfamiliar with outsider work "turn to those they recognize
as experts in the genre for their assessment."' 99
Outsider criteria includes suitability for a chosen audience, success
in advancing the interests of the outsider community, and a theme
188. Id.
189. See Austin, supra note 69.
190. Delgado, supra note 74.
191. Williams, supra note 123.
192. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 255 (1994).
193. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
194. Delgado, supra note 88, at 561 n.15.
195. See supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
196. Coombs, supra note 52, at 703.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 713. "An explicit encouragement of passionate engagement with one's sub-
ject, I suspect, helps us produce better scholarship." Id. at n.120.
199. Id. at 709.
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"true to the vision of those for whom the work purports to speak."20 0
"Finally, of course, many of the criteria for excellence applicable to
traditional scholarship such as clarity, originality, and ambitions can
also be applied. ... 2o1
Professor Delgado uses a different argument to deflect insider eval-
uation. In a reply to Farber and Sherry,202 he accuses them of failing
to understand what outsider storytelling is all about; their article con-
tains "a number of curious lapses."20 3 For example, they do not distin-
guish storytelling from the more traditional style of Critical Race
Theory jurisprudence,204 most stories are in fact supplemented with
"analysis and commentary that will enable the reader to connect the
story with a more general rule or principle,"205 and they ignore
"counterstories." Counterstories "jar, mock, or displace a tenant of the
majoritarian faith."206 Finally, Delgado says that Farber and Sherry's
concern that the audience is unlikely to be converted by stories misses
the point; storytellers aim at a variety of audiences: "progressive
scholars, other crits, or the minority commentary itself."20 7 The bot-
tom line is that majoritarian bias blocks out the values and message of
outsider narratives. 208 Then Delgado calls for a truce: forget about
evaluation, its too early. "Sometimes it may be better to live with un-
certainty a little longer, tolerate a degree of experimentation, rather
than shut off a world crossing experiment that may one day benefit us
all.209
Instead of evaluative criteria, Professor Abrams provides perspec-
tive and advice.210 She vehemently rejects the dominant scholar's re-
liance on objectivity, arguing that it is anathema to narrative. 2 11
Insider dominant scholars must recognize the emergence of a subcom-
munity of scholars who are developing a new and legitimate form of
scholarship.212 The objective is to bring people from other subcom-
200. Id. at 713-14.
201. Id. at 715.
202. Delgado, supra note 114.
203. Id. at 668. "These errors, committed by serious and careful commentators, cast
doubt on the entire evaluative enterprise." Id.
204. "This is not a minor quibble: Farber and Sherry focus on the alleged defects of
narrative jurisprudence, yet often impute them to CRT as a whole." Id. at 669.
205. Id. at 670. "Narratives, standing alone, of the sort Farber and Sherry condemn,
are rare." Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 671.
208. "Majoritarian tools of analysis, themselves only stories, inevitably will pronounce
outsider versions lacking in typicality, rigor, generalizability, and truth." Id. at
675.
209. Id. at 676.
210. Abrams, supra note 14.
211. Id. at 1013, 1015, 1028, 1041.
212. This is part of an ongoing process in legal scholarship. "In this period of newly
'fractured horizons' in legal scholarship, it is critically important for scholars to
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munities and the narrative style into a bond of common understand-
ing.2 1 3 Once the reader realizes that outsider writers have varied
objectives and do, however cryptically, fashion narrative connections,
the criticism becomes irrelevant.214
"Perspective" is interesting but is not too helpful when it comes
down to the nitty-gritty of evaluation. However, there is a practicalinsight in Abram's advice: narratives are not fungible and evaluation
turns on the category under scrutiny.215
VII. EVALUATING STORYTELLING: CATEGORIES
One reason that critics of narrative have difficulty in devising eval-
uation criteria is that they give little, if any, attention to the signifi-
cance of classification. They make the incorrect assumption that all
storytelling comes from outsiders and is similar in style and motiva-
tion.216 In fact, there is a range of categories, each with its own style,
motive, and perspective. The failure to recognize and deal with the
various categories leads to meaningless generalizations, confusion,
and false assumptions. It obscures the existence of common elements
that connect all categories.217
The threshold problem is the indiscriminate use of the word "nar-
rative" or "story." Outsiders sometimes refer to their work as a story:
it is the telling of "my story."2 18 For example, Professor Dalton refers
to her analysis of contract doctrine as a story: "I do not believe that
my story is the only one that can be told about contract doctrine. I
insist only that it is an important story to tell."219 Her article is not,
elaborate the understandings of conventions underlying work within their sub-
disciplinary communities." Id. at 1016.
213. "1I believe that it is possible to make them [methodological conventions] clear
enough that members of another group can understand what is being said and
done and see how it differs from the conventions operative within their own
group." Id. at 1019.
214. "Readers must learn to be sensitive to the distinctive voice of the author.., and
flexible about approaching a variety of external forms. They must teach them-
selves to discern the unifying threads of a nonlinear argument, or draw out the
normative implications of a richly detailed story . " Id. at 1042 (footnote
omitted).
215. Abrams identifies at least four types of narratives: first-person agony narrative;
insider experiences; narratives that provide a metaphor for a concept; flash of
self-recognition. Id. at 1025-1026.
216. Outsiders do not make this assumption. Id. Delgado suggests that narratives
are addressed to a variety of audiences. Delgado, supra note 114, at 671.
217. See supra notes 202-216 and infra notes 218-232 and accompanying text.
218. Mary Irene Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, orA Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response
to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988). "My story is best
understood in the context of a broader feminist analysis of law texts in general
and the particular textbook as a whole." Id. at 117.
219. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 1113 (1985).
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however, a story according to the Bell or Williams narrative tech-
nique; instead it is an advocacy interpretation written in the conven-
tional law review structure-a linear text incorporating copious
footnotes referencing standard sources. Hence, use of the word "story"
in this context is in reality an announcement that outsiders have a
different interpretation of conventional doctrine.220
A. "Stories" About Pedagogy, Law School, and the
Profession
Because this category has overlap in several characteristics, it
stands at the edge of storytelling. There is narrative, the "stories"
come from the author's experiences, and are often subjective and emo-
tional. What separates them from storytelling is that the primary
goal is to convey information about a project or to expose a pedagocial
flaw. This genre is similar to a computer network that conveys notices
and descriptions of activities. There is no scholarly aspiration. The
following quotes reflect the theme of this category:
"My goal for the winter term of the LRW program was to reconstruct a legal
academic exercise into a process of political sensitization."2 2 1 "I start many of
my law school courses with a description of myself.'2 2 2 "Take risks. Tell your
own stories and be willing to think out loud in class."2 2 3 "This is the story of
a law school course I planned on legal and policy issues affecting women of
color."2 2 4 "Why would a law professor be interested in rock and roll? Why
might law students find rock music helpful for law study?"2 2 5 "Teaching fem-
inist legal theory at the J. Reuben Clark Law School of Brigham Young Uni-
versity is, at the least, a conversation piece."2 2 6
220. See, e.g.,Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpre-
tations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HAnv. L. REv. 1749 (1990); Bender, supra note 101, at 3;
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1994);
Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 Tax. L. REv. 381 (1989).
221. Richard F. Devlin, Legal Education As Political Consciousness-Raising or Paving
the Road to Hell, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 213, 217 (1989). See also Julius G. Getman,
A Story of Voice, U. Prrr. L. REv. 973 (1994); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their
Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 485 (1994);
Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a
Criminal Case, STAN. L. REv. 39 (1994).
222. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching:
Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REv. 539, 539 (1991).
223. Patricia A. Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listening to Differ-
ence and Exploring Connections, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 165, 180 (1988). See also
James Allan, A Post-Speluncean Dialogue, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 519 (1994).
224. Judy Scales-Trent, Using Literature in Law School: The Importance of Reading
and Telling Stories, 7 BEmcaLEY Wozum's L.J. 90, 90 (1992).
225. Gary Minda, Phenomenology, Tina Turner and the Law, 16 N. M. L. Rev. 479,
479 (1986).
226. Cheryl B. Preston, Joining Traditional Values and Feminist Legal Scholarship,
43 J. LEGAL EDUc. 511, 511 (1993).
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I would also include in this category "stories" in autobiographical
form about practice-such as a description of service as a special
master 227-and narrative discussion of legal problems.228 Speech au-
tobiographies also belong in this genre: "But law school really did a
number on me."229
B. Insider Storytelling
The Case of the Speluncean Explorer was published in 1949,230
thirty-six years before Professor Bell's Chronicles.231 The Supreme
Court of Newgarth in the year 4300 resolves the case of trapped ex-
plorers who roll dice to decide which one will be killed and eaten.23 2
Then there is the fiction of novelist-lawyer Louis Auchincloss whose
two short stories flush out the nuances of senior partner influence. 233
Professor Erik Jensen and I have published satires on the law acad-
emy,23 4 while Professor Cornell has produced a scene from a play.2 3 5
While all of these pieces "touch" on law, they are not ideological in
the sense of outsider narratives. Another group of nonideological
227. Curtis J. Berger,Away From the Court House and into the Field: The Odyssey of a
Special Master, 78 COLUm. L. REv. 707 (1978). See also Philip G. Schrag, On Her
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York City, 80 YALE L.J.
1529 (1971)("to give law students an idea of the day-to-day activities and profes-
sional life-style of one type of 'public interest' lawyer....").
228. Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 LAw
& Soc'y REv. 19 (1993); William L.F. Felstiner and Austin Sarat, Enactments of
Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77
CowRiLL L. REv. 1447 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. Rav. 1
(1990).
229. Ann 0. Scales, Midnight Train to US, 75 CoRNELL L. REV. 710, 711 (1990).
230. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HAnv. L. REV. 616 (1949).
The story continues to get attention: William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell,
61 GEO. WASH. L. Ray. 1731 (1993).
231. Bell, Chronicles, supra note 70.
232. Professor Lubet used the same format to resolve a disciplinary complaint against
a lawyer who saved the life of a litigant by urinating on him. "Stepping quickly to
the witness stand he climbed upon a chair, dropped his pinstriped trousers, and
succeeded in dousing the flames." Steven Lubet, Civility:A Tale of Deconstruction
and Constraint, 1992 Wis. L. Rav. 157, 158. See also Norman Redlich, Law
School Faculty Hiring Under Title WI: How a Judge Might Decide a Disparate
Impact Case, 41 J. Legal Educ. 135 (1991)(telling the story of a law professor who
finds a copy of a judicial opinion on his desk).
233. Louis Auchincloss, Abel Donner, 75 VA. L. Rav. 1 (1989); Louis Auchincloss, The
Senior Partner's Ghosts, 50 VA. L. REv. 195 (1964).
234. Erik M. Jensen, Tough on Scholarship, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1285 (1993); Erik M.
Jensen, A Day in the Life of S. Breckinridge Tushingham, 69 DENy. U. L. Ray.
231 (1992). Arthur Austin, The Waste Land, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1229; Arthur
Austin, An Allegory on the Banks of the Nile, 39 KAN. L. REv. 929 (1991); Arthur
Austin, Scoff Law School Debates Whether a Male Can Teach a Course in Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, 18 J. LEGAL PROF. 203 (1993).
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storytelling focuses on specific areas of law. This includes dia-
logues,236 conversations, 23 7 and fictional accounts of events that in-
volve legal issues. The most prolific author of the legal issue narrative
is Professor Norval Morris who has produced a series of stories around
the experiences of Eric Blair (George Orwell's real name)238 "which
Professor Morris claims (although this claim has not been verified) are
based upon a set of manuscripts he discovered while retracing the
travels Blair made while serving in Burma between 1923 and
1927."239
Finally, there is humor, a long standing subject for lawyers and
professors. 240 This is an eclectic category which includes narratives of
events like faculty meetings, 2 41 dialogues,242 plays, 2 43 an "0de,"244
and monologues.245 The objective of the humor game is to poke fun,
not politicize.
C. Outsider Storytelling
As to either style or objectives, outsider storytelling is not a homo-
geneous category. On the outer edge there are "stories"-expressions
235. Drucilla L. Cornell, The Dream Cure, 10 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 87 (1991).
Professor Rodney Smolla produces plays dealing with legal issues, such as The
Trial of Oliver Wendel Holmes. Faculty Honors, Syllabus, Summer 1994, at 11.
236. E.g., David P. Bryden, On Race and Diversity, 6 CONST. ConWIENTARY 383 (1989);
James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About The Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 987 (1990); Peter D. Junger, A Dialog Concerning the Delivery of
Gifts, 38 U. MwiI L. REv. 123 (1983).
237. E.g., Allan C. Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation (with
Suggestions on How to Make Bouillabaisse), 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850 (1985)(conver-
sation exchange among three people as background for discussion of the power
factor in law).
238. Orwell was a British novelist best known for 1984 (1949).
239. Norval Morris, The Veraswami Story, 52 U. CI. L. REv. 948, n.* (1985). For a
collection of Morris stories see NORVAL MoRRSu, THE BROTHEL Boy, AND OTHER
PARABLES OF THE LAw (1992).
240. See James D. Gordon III, A Bibliography of Humor and the Law, 1992 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 427.
241. Paul Bergman, 2010: A Clinical Odyssey, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 349; Anthony
D'Amato, Minutes of the Faculty Meeting, 1992 B.Y.U. L. RIv. 359; Austin, Alle-
gory, supra note 234.
242. Daniel A. Farber, The Jurisprudential Cab Ride: A Socratic Dialogue, 1992
B.Y.U. L. REV. 363; Paul A. LeBel, Legal Education and the Theatre of the Ab-
surd: "Can't Anybody Play This Here Game?", 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 413; John B.
Mitchell, Don't Ever Discuss Rust v. Sullivan With a Lady In a Grocery Line, 9
CONST. COMMENTARY 25 (1992).
243. Gail Levin Richmond & Carol A. Roehrenbeck, From Tedious to Trendy: A Tax
Teacher's Triumph, 17 NOVA L. Rv. 739 (1993); Marc Rohr, Socrates' Class: A
One-Act Play, 17 NOVA L. REV. 839 (1993).
244. Kenneth Lasson, Rummel v. Estelle, Mockingbirds Among the Brethren, 18 Am.
Cnpa. L. REV. 441 (1981).
245. Erik M. Jensen, A Monologue on the Taxation of Business Gifts, 1992 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 397.
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of ideological interpretations written in conventional doctrinal
style.246 These are excluded from this discussion which refers to the
use of narrative to articulate minority and feminists ideology, percep-
tions, and experiences. This category falls into two groups-the law
parable and encounter/conflict stories.24 7
1. Law Parable2 4S
Under this format the writer uses the parable medium in conjunc-
tion with text and/or footnote references. The text is used either to
introduce background information to set up the parable or to discuss
and analyze the meaning of the parable. For example, the parable can
be used to take the introductory text to a higher, more subtle level.249
It has been exploited to shock and force the audience to confront race
issues. 25 0 Likewise the parable can be used to dramatize the insider's
246. See supra notes 218-13 and accompanying text.
247. There is a third category: Outsider Miscellaneous. I include in this category
monologues, such as a convicted murderer's impression of prison, see Mumia
Abu-Jamal, Teetering on the Brink: Between Death and Life, 100 YALE L.J. 993
(1991); reflections on law school experience, see Patty Rauch, Reminiscence, 10
NovA L.J. 793 (1986); parable about problem solving, see Gerald R. Lopez, Lay
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. Rnv. 1 (1984); creating a story by extrapolating from the
events of a case to show prison dehumanization, see Thomas Ford Ascher, If I
Had A Hammer... I'd Still Need Some Nails: A Fictitious Reconstruction of
Hudson v. Palmer, 9 LAw & INEQ. J. 115 (1990). For an outsider dialogue see
Dinesh Khosa and Patricia Williams, Economies of Mind: A Collaborative Reflec-
tion, 10 NovA L.J. 619 (1986).
248. "[P]arable, a brief tale intended to be understood as an allegory illustrating some
lesson or moral." CHmS BALDiaic, Tim CONCISE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF LrERARY
TEms 159 (1990).
"[Aillegory, a story or visual image with a second distinct meaning partially
hidden behind its literal or visible meaning." Id. at 5.
249. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Integration in the 1980s: The Dream of Diversity and
the Cycle of Exclusion, 64 TuL. L. REv. 1625 (1990)(story about the ploys used by
the majoritarian culture to frustrate minority hiring). See also Marc A. Fajer,
Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes,
and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MAsi L. REv. 511
(1992)(use of short story vignettes to dramatize problems of gays in a heterosex-
ual society).
250. See Derrick Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2382 (1989). The initial paragraphs describe an explosion that rips
apart the Harvard University President's house, killing him and every member of
the Association-a group of Black professors and administrators. "None who
heard or saw it ever forgot the earth-shaking explosion and the huge nuclear-like
fireball." Id. at 2382. The purpose of the meeting had been to address exclusion
of Blacks from all parts of Harvard. The remainder of the story is an account of
the Association's deliberations and efforts to deal with an insider administration.
The story of Final Report did in fact serve as the introduction for an affirma-
tive action report submitted by the Harvard Association of Black Faculty and
Administration to Derek Bok, President of Harvard. Bell was co chair. "By plac-
ing the summaries of our meetings with the deans within the context of an alle-
gorical tragedy, we aim to spark a new level of discussion as to why Harvard
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self-serving invocation of objective and rational standards.251 The
mixture of parable with text can flush out the issues from a dual per-
spective. For example, Richard Delgado takes a "race-tinged event"
and describes it in a series of five stories. "Each account is followed by
analysis, showing what the story includes and leaves out and how it
perpetuates one version of social reality rather than another."252
The originator of the parable technique, 253 Derrick Bell, continues
to use it to explore race. His pessimism about the future of Blacks in
the U.S. is the theme of his text introduction to a parable about the
"space traders."254 In the year 2000, a fleet of space ships appear to
trade with what has become an economically besieged U.S. The trad-
ers offer gold, critical chemicals and safe nuclear power in exchange
for all African Americans. There is loud indignation at this offer of
slave trading. After reflection, an enabling constitutional amendment
is approved by a seventy percent vote and the trade is made. "And
just as the forced importation of those African ancestors had made the
nation's wealth and productivity possible, so their forced exodus saved
the country from the need to pay the price of its greed-based
excess."255
In addition to being an active advocate of narrative,256 Richard
Delgado is a prolific practitioner of the genre. He imitates Bell (even
cannot begin aggressively doing now what most certainly would be done if our
community suffered a calamity like that portrayed in The Final Report." Id. at
2394. In an interview Bell described Bok's reaction: "Derek Bok was not pleased.
So we went to meet with him. And he said, 'What were you trying to do?' And I
said: 'We were trying to help you get this affirmative action thing up on the
agenda for discussion.' And he said: 'Well, you don't have to blow me up.' Kind of
missed the whole point." Austin, supra note 69, at 6.
251. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357 (1992).
252. Delgado, supra note 74, at 2415. In responding to the Farber and Sherry criti-
cism that stories lack analysis and commentary, (supra note 75, at 846-53), Del-
gado said: "True, but irrelevant-most of us already follow this counsel. In
perhaps the most notable example of legal storytelling, Derrick Bell and his inter-
locutor, Geneva, agree that their conversations must include statistics, case au-
thority, and doctrinal analysis lest their colleagues reject their work as
nonrigorous. Most of us instinctively follow Bell's example; only a handful of the
articles we reviewed consisted of unadorned narratives. Narratives, standing
alone, of the sort Farber and Sherry condemn, are rare." Delgado, supra note
114, at 670 (footnotes omitted).
253. Bell, Chronicles, supra note 70 and accompanying text.
254. Derrick Bell, After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations On America in a Post-Ra-
cial Epoch, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 393 (1990).
255. Id. at 400. For a "revision" of Bell's parable see Richard Delgado and Jean
Stefancic, Derrick Bell's Chronicle of the Space Traders: Would the U.S. Sacrifice
People of Color if the Price Were Right?, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 321 (1991). In the
revision parable, the trade was rejected by a 93% margin. After congratulating
the earth people on their "breakthrough," the aliens made a gift of the valuable
commodities. Id. at 326.
256. See supra note 74.
[Vol. 74:479
EVALUATING STORYTELLING
his lead character is the younger half brother of Bell's Geneva Cren-
shaw) with a series of Chronicles that carries the race issue into an
eclectic range of topics such as law and economics, socialism, and
faculty politics.257 Delgado is an aggressive evangelist for the out-
sider movement and, like Bell, he supports his arguments with exten-
sive cites and references.
2. Encounter/Conflict
This category focuses on events that expose victimization or con-
flicts between the outsider as narrator and insider values. The objec-
tive is to challenge the reader with the story, not with text or
footnotes. Professor Russell, for example, uses a story unadorned with
references to describe the trauma of a mental encounter: one morning
the narrator discovers that someone has placed a National Geographic
in her mailbox with a picture of a gorilla on its cover.258 "It was a
time-worn message communicated to persons who are not white."2 5 9
The narrator uses the "encounter" as a catalyst for an examination of
her emotions as a "blackwoman scholar" working in an insider law
school.260 Like other narrators,261 Russell uses the encounter/conflict
as part of a catharsis in which feelings, tensions, and frustrations are
examined within a race or gender context.
The best known-and most provocative-Encounter/Conflict
writer is Patricia Williams. She established the model for experience
257. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears-On the
Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REv. 503 (1994); Richard Delgado, Ro-
drigo's Seventh Chronicle: Race, Democracy, and the State, 41 UCLA L. REv. 721
(1994); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and
the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 639 (1993); Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle: Civitas, Civil Wrongs, and the Politics of Denial, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1581 (1993); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neu-
trality and Stasis inAntidiscrimination Law, 45 STAw. L. REv. 1133 (1993); Rich-
ard Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle: Care, Competition and the Redemptive
Tragedy of Race, 81 CAL. L. REv. 389 (1993), Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second
Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 Mic. L. REv. 1183 (1993);
Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, supra, note 251.
258. Jennifer M. Russell, On Being a Gorilla in Your Midst, or, the Life of One
Blackwoman in the Legal Academy, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 259 (1993).
259. Id. at 260.
260. "Trotigh it all, the blackwoman scholar must appear neither hypersensitive nor
paranoid." Id. at 261.
261. Ruth P. Knight, Remembering, 40 J. LEGAL EDuc. 97 (1990); Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag
Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law, 13
NOVA L. REv. 355 (1989); Perry J. Nagle, Borrowed Sweaters, 14 HARv. WoMEN's
L.J. 355 (1991); Nancy Cook, This Sort of Thing, 14 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 335
(1991). See also Victoria Guest, St. Landry Loan Company v. Avie, 14 H-Inv. Wo-
amias L.J. 327 (1991)(story of"an illiterate, French-speaking negro" held account-
able for the debt of another by objective legal system).
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narrative with the Benetton story,2 62 which is still a magnet for
controversy. 2 63
"Buzzers are big in New York City."2 64 They are crowd screening
devices used by stores to determine the identity of customers. The
avowed objective is crime prevention. Christmas shopping one Satur-
day, Williams as narrator sought admission to a Benetton store. "A
narroweyed, white teenager wearing running shoes and feasting on
bubble gum glared out, evaluating me for signs that would pit me
against the limits of his social understanding. After about five
seconds, he mouthed 'We're closed,' and blew pink rubber at me."2 65
Williams analyzes her rage at the boy, ultimately realizing that
when Blacks participate in the buzzer system, they accept self-hatred.
Several days later she types an account of her "story" which is the
centerpiece of a poster she sticks on the store window. The next event
comes when the story is submitted to a law review where the editor
tries to delete reference to race. "It's irrelevant... [and] doesn't ad-
vance the discussion of any principle."266
Delgado is correct in noting that stories, "standing alone.., are
rare."26 7 In fact, when it first appeared in the Miami Law Review,268
the Benetton story was introductory to text. As with the law parable
genre it is not unusual to encounter a blend of experiences and text/
footnotes. One technique is to use a short description of an experience
to dramatize or humanize the theme of the article. Professor Estrich
achieved dramatic effect by introducing her article on rape law with a
chilling account of her experiences as a rape victim.2 6 9 "Eleven years
ago, a man held an ice pick to my throat and said: 'Push over, shut up,
or I'll kill you.' "270 In another example, Professor Brown presents her
encounter with an NRA "type"271 in order to give a more graphic slant
to her rebuttal of Professor Levinson's discussion of the historical un-
262. It first appeared in a law review (Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messen-
ger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U.
MiAM L. REv. 127 (1987)) and was embellished to appear as a chapter in PAT-
CiA J. Wn.ii~is, TnE ALcHEmy O RACE Ain RIGHTS (1991).
263. See infra notes 346-56 and accompanying text.
264. WmLiAmS, ALCHEMY, supra note 262, at 44.
265. Id. at 44-45.
266. Id. at 47-48.
267. Delgado, supra note 114, at 670.
268. See Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger, supra note 262.
269. Susan R. Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986)(article was subsequently pub-
lished as a book: SusAN R. ESTRCH, REAL RAPE (1987)).
270. Estrich, Rape, supra note 269, at 1087.
271. Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism:
On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661
(1989). Although he helped jump start her vehicle, she reflects that in a different
setting the encounter could have resulted in rape. She thus uses the experience
to shift the issue "to the differences between the social positioning and exper-
iences of men and women in our culture." Id. at 667.
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derpinnings of the Second Amendment.272 Despite the use of narra-
tive, the Estrich and Brown pieces are doctrinal and would be
evaluated as traditional scholarship.273 In Encounter/Conflict narra-
tives, the experiences dominate to tell the story while the text or notes
are peripheral. For example, in William's Alchemical Notes,274 she in-
troduces the theme with allegory and then uses a text section to de-
scribe the conflict between the CLS movement that seeks a new
political system and the minority advocacy of a rights based theory.275
What follows is a series of experiences that support the need for a
rights theory.2 76
VIII. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING STORYTELLING
The issue of evaluation is bogged down in the defensiveness of out-
siders to critics who reject or disdain storytelling.2 77 The result is a
growing division among members of the academy over scholarship. It
is important that the conflict be resolved before the dialogue gets more
contentious. Moreover, a "truce" as advocated by Professor Del-
gado,278 merely delays a resolution while the issue is exacerbated by
the continued appearance of stories. Finally, it is inappropriate to
272. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637
(1989).
273. Another example is Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v.
Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CALn'. L. REv.
1401 (1993). The author's brief narrative describes the trauma of the transition
from an all black high school to Princeton. Id. at 1439-43.
274. Williams, supra note 122.
275. "CLS has ignored the degree to which rights-assertion and the benefits of rights
have helped blacks, other minorities, and the poor." Id. at 405.
276. Another example of this technique is Waugh, supra note 7. The footnotes provide
narratives, historical references, and commentary to embellish an Encounter/
Conflict poem. On occasion footnotes are obviously surplusage and irrelevant to
narrative. See, e.g., Ashe, supra note 261; Patricia J. Williams, Commercial
Rights and Constitutional Wrongs, 49 MD. L. Rlv. 293 (1990).
277. Criticism even comes from fellow outsiders. Mark Tushnet, a CLS founder, says
"I have been uncomfortable with the publication of law review articles in the form
of short stories, or short stories in the form of law review articles, because they
strike me as yet another manifestation of the 'lawyer as astrophysicist' mentality
that I have criticized." See Mark Tushnet, Trust, Justice, and the American Way:
An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. Rxv.
1307, 1338 n.140 (1979). "This was brought home to me in a conversation with a
former roommate, now a professor of literature, in which my wife and I were
trying to identify the author of a line of poetry quoted in a newspaper puzzle. My
friend immediately began by saying something like, Well, it couldn't be by X be-
cause the line is too long for him.' I realized then that there is a world of under-
standing about literature to which I essentially have no access, and I now wonder
about the degree to which other law professors do." Tushnet, supra note 97, at
1515 n.l. See Lloyd Cohen, A Different Black Voice in Legal Scholarship, 37
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 301 (1992).
278. Delgado, supra note 114.
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leave storytellers and those who want to use narrative dangling with-
out guidance.279
Any evaluation system must exploit the commentary of previous
studies of scholarship. They, along with the views of outsiders like
Delgado, Coombs, and Abrams, have identified some of the major
problems. Their commentary provides counsel for defining criteria.
A. Delivering the Message
Evaluation must first confront the unfamiliarity problem. Schol-
ars who are trained in the traditional delivery system of knowledge
intuitively reject storytelling as a fringe fad of ephemeral duration.
This perspective can be neutralized by calling on two basic instincts of
traditional scholarship: objectivity and doubt. Scholars are trained to
be objective about the existence of new methods and ideas. Likewise,
self-induced doubt over one's assumptions is a fundamental experi-
ence of the scholar. The evaluator should "become aware of the doubts
and anxieties about her own approach that the author's work induces,
and use those sensibilities as a guide in deploying the evaluative
criteria."280
The threshold test for any work of scholarship is successful deliv-
ery, a concept that is similar to Rubin's "clarity" test.281 The author
must identify and compose the message in a form that can be under-
stood by the community. The type of delivery system-be it doctrinal,
interdisciplinary, or narrative-is irrelevant; the test is whether the
audience knows what the message is about. Delivery also means that
the message comes in a logical and rational progression-one point is
logically positioned in rational reference to previous and future
statements.282
279. There is, moreover, an explicit mandate for resolution from the AALS Report.
See AALS Report, supra note 18.
280. Rubin, supra note 161, at 945-46. "Rather, the test is whether the evaluator ex-
periences sufficient doubt or anxiety so that she must persuade herself that she is
right. If one finds oneself rehearsing one's prior arguments, or articulating refu-
tations in one's mind, or searching assiduously for new ways to justify one's con-
clusions, then a work which generates such responses should be judged to be of
value. Thus, the very process of formulating counter-arguments which is a mech-
anism for outright rejection of the author's work when uncritically performed,
becomes a datum for assessing that work's quality in the context of a more disci-
plined evaluative theory." Id. at 946.
281. Id. at 915. "The legal scholar can achieve understanding only by identifying his
controlling norms with clarity and by explaining their relationships to his specific
arguments." Id.
282. "Similarly, although it is conceivable for a work that is, for example, poorly writ-
ten or lacking in reasoned analysis to be good scholarship, we believe that it is
unlikely." Farber & Sherry, supra note 75, at 847.
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Bell's Space Traders283 parable passes the delivery test. The text
introduction is an historical review of white dominance and the legal
and economic oppression of blacks, followed by the story and a con-
cluding discussion. The message implicit in the parable-and made
explicit in the conclusion-is that race is a matter of status and prop-
erty rights. "The subordination of blacks seems to reassure whites of
an unspoken, but no less certain, property right in their
'whiteness.' 284
B. It Must Add Something
This is the combat zone of evaluation where critics drift into gener-
alities like "originality." Threatening the discussion is doubt as to
whether law can generate the level of scholarship acceptable in other
disciplines. 28 5 Nevertheless, scholarship is the vehicle to credibility in
the university culture and the ultimate test of credibility is an evalua-
tion process that can identify "impact." The broad test of impact is
universal to all disciplines: does the work add something to the ex-
isting body of knowledge, does it supply a new or different perspective,
or, as might occur in the hard sciences, does it present a new
paradigm.
While a test of "originality" has meaning in physics and patent law,
it is irrelevant to legal scholarship. There are no "eurekas" in law.
Progress comes in increments. Charles Reich's The New Property2 86
describes property rights in government entitlements while Ward
Bowman's article on tying arrangements disputed conventional wis-
dom to provide a new perspective on the competitive effects of the re-
straint.2 s7 Both articles criticize prevailing assumptions, expose gaps,
and force the reader to consider alternative arguments. They comply
with George Stigler's observation that "Creativity often, and perhaps
usually, consists of looking at familiar things or ideas in a new
way."288 Under the Stigler test impact comes from the incremental
addition to existing concepts. Does the article change the existing pa-
rameters of knowledge by adding a new context?
Bell's Space Traders would have serious problems with this test. It
merely summarizes the history of racial oppression without adding a
283. Bell, supra note 254.
284. Id. at 402. Farber and Sherry conclude that Ashe's narrative, supra note 261,
fails the delivery test. She bombards the audience with a multitude of graphic
physical details about her reproductive experience supported by "some brief and
cryptic suggestions about law interspersed among the stories." Farber & Sherry,
supra note 75, at 847.
285. See supra articles collected in note 1.
286. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YAm L.J. 733 (1964).
287. Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19 (1957).
288. GEORGE J. STIGLR, MEMOIRS OF AN UNNRGULATED ECONOMIST 79 (1988).
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context of new or different perspectives. 28 9 On the other hand, his
Chronicles29 0 did make a contribution to the dialogue on the Supreme
Court's responses to race. The work product of the Court is challenged
by four chronicles which describe difficult choices. 2 9 1 The debate be-
tween the cynical Geneva Crenshaw and her friend (presumably Bell)
does what the conventional doctrinal article does-provides a discus-
sion of various legal assumptions with critical exchanges. The result
is an analysis of what the Court has ostensibly done, what Bell sees as
reality, and predictions on the future. Chronicles satisfies the Stigler
test.
C. The Dialogue
One of the primary objectives of scholarship is to open a dialogue
within the community. It is the only way that ideas can be challenged
and tested. "Because articles are part of an ongoing scholarly dia-
logue, even biting criticism is preferable to silence from other schol-
289. "For example, the tenth story documenting how it feels to be discriminated
against is not as original as the first, and does not contribute to knowledge unless
it either proposes a new legal solution or describes as discriminatory something
that might not ordinarily strike us as particularly hurtful." Farber & Sherry,
supra note 75, at 848 (footnote omitted).
290. Bell, Chronicles, supra note 70.
291. In her first Chronicle, Geneva describes the Celestial Curia, a group of three
Black women with unusual powers who are pondering how to deal with "an in-
dustrial nation that continued to prosper through the systematic exploitation of
the lower classes, particularly those that were not white." Id. at 18. The solution
was to have Agent H infiltrate the Supreme Court to convince the Court to favor
the upper classes so obviously that the exploited will revolt." The Curia was con-
vinced that social justice can be achieved only through the stimulus of a conserva-
tive, uncaring Supreme Court." Id. at 20.
In the second Chronicle, Geneva is a law professor when the school received a
substantial gift to subsidize the addition of minority faculty. When the minority
faculty approached twenty-five percent, the Dean told Geneva that the "tipping
point" had been reached and that "we want to retain our image as a white school."
"[A] law school of our caliber and tradition simply cannot look like a professional
basketball team." Id. at 42.
The Amber Cloud descended to infect the white youth of the nation's most
prosperous families, changing their color to amber and their behavior to resemble
"that of many children in the most disadvantaged and poverty-ridden ghettoes,
barrios, and reservations." Id. at 57. Many blamed Blacks for the disaster.
Eventually a cure was discovered. "The Amber Cloud Cure bill included a 'target-
ing' provision that specifically limited access to the treatment to victims of the
Amber Cloud" thereby excluding minority youth. Id. at 59.
Geneva concludes with the Slave Scrolls Chronicle. Discovered in Ghana by
Geneva, they describe slave oppression in the U.S. and how Blacks survived with
"healing" sessions, which ultimately led to a "fierce desire to excel." Id. at 70.
Fearful of Black success, whites enacted Racial Toleration Laws which prohibited
the healing sessions. .
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ars."2 92  Readers must have something-an argument, theory,
proposal-to examine and test. Indeed, it is the thoroughness of the
dialogue and examination process that determines the credibility of
the article.
Critics argue that there is no potential for dialogue in storytelling.
Purportedly they do not generate a unique approach to research and
do not contain sufficient, if any, analysis that can provide a basis for
counterargument. 293 Each story is, according to this interpretation, a
dead end street, an "experience" that stands by itself.294
On one issue-the credibility of storytelling as a productive meth-
odology of legal scholarship-we already have a vigorous dialogue.
That is what this Article is about. Moreover, in the process of the dis-
cussion, critics and storytelling advocates have examined such things
as plot, objectives, and effectiveness.
Those who reject the dialogue potential ignore the methodology of
writers like Bell. The Chronicles is an invitation for rebuttal-it sup-
plies research, argument, and interpretation. 29 5 Likewise, Delgado
presents ample provocation and opportunity for rebuttal. The com-
mon feature of the law parable is the existence of text and footnotes to
provide a basis for dialogue. But suppose there is no text or footnotes?
There should be no problem if the story "delivers a message" to
readers. For example, the Case of the Speluncean Explorers296 does
deliver a clear and intriguing message that continues to generate dia-
logue.29 7 Recently the Explorers dialogue was extended to include
multicultural experiences and perspectives, including feminism, 2 98
Critical Race Theory,299 and indeterminacy.300 The Blair narratives
of Norval Morris also meet this criterion; his plots give the audience
292. Farber & Sherry, supra note 75, at 850. "The new ideas will normally require
much repetition, elaboration, and desirably, controversy, for controversy is an at-
tention getter and sometimes a thought getter." STiGrLE, supra note 288, at 67.
293. Rubin, supra note 161, at 955-56.
294. Farber & Sherry, supra note 75, at 850-51.
295. For a dialogue on Bell's Chronicles, see A Forum On Derrick Bell's Civil Rights
Chronicles, 34 ST. Louis L.J. 393 (1990).
296. See Fuller, supra note 230.
297. "A historical understanding of those debates reveals the breathtaking intellectual
accomplishment of Fuller's article which closes one period of American statutory
law (legislative positivism), announces its successor (the legal process school),
and anticipates the arguments that will bedevil the successor in its turn." Es-
kridge, supra note 230, at 1732.
298. Naomi R. Cahn et al., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contemporary Pro-
ceedings, 61 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1754 (1993)(seven authors' analyses); id. at 1755
(Naomi R. Cahn); id. at 1785 (Mary I. Coombs); id. at 1807 (Laura W. Stein).
299. Id. at 1764 (John 0. Calmone); id. at 1790 (Dwight L. Greene).
300. Id. at 1798 (Geoffrey C. Miller).
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hard choices on legal issues, thereby inviting response and
dialogue.301
D. The Aesthetic Factor
By emphasizing the unique relevance of the narrative style, outsid-
ers cannot avoid a reference to aesthetics. 30 2 Likewise, critics should
not shrug off aesthetics without learning what the aesthetic compo-
nent is and how it could be helpful in the evaluation process. The as-
sumption that the application of aesthetic criteria is problematic can
be rebutted by the existence of a rich body of literature on narrative as
a short story.3o3 It is therefore possible to put together reasonable,
understandable and workable guidelines for use by legal scholars.
"A story is an apocalypse, served in a very small cup."30 4 A short
story is a narrative with a plot3O5-"[a] narrative without a plot is a
logical impossibility"30-and an ending or a closure. "All short sto-
ries ... proceed to a revelation that establishes a teleology, a retro-
spective sense of design, informing the whole story." 07 It is short and
self-contained, and a "vigorous compression is essential."308 The rea-
301. For an analysis of a Morris story see infra notes 320-25 and accompanying text.
302. Farber and Sherry reject narrative as literature.
In rejecting the creation of literature as a form of legal scholarship, we
are admittedly indulging a mild presumption in favor of institutional
specialization. While works of literature may well be a source of impor-
tant insights for lawyers, we contend that creating literature has little
nexus with the specific institutional traits of law schools, and seems far
more congenial to other settings such as creative writing departments or
traditional communities of writers and artists. Thus, we do not believe
that the production of literature ought to be considered part of the mis-
sion of law schools. Just because something is worthwhile does not
mean that it should take place under a law school umbrella. Indeed, to
the extent that fictional or fictionalized accounts purport to be scholar-
ship, they jeopardize the credibility of legal scholarship.
Farber & Sherry, supra note 75, at 845 (footnotes omitted).
303. This dates at least back to Aristotle's Poetics. "In the ancient history of the
human use of narrative as a mode of communication, the short story precedes the
long story as the most natural means of narrative communication." Charles E.
May, The Nature of Knowledge in Short Fiction in STuDiEs iN SHORT FICTION 327
(1984). On Poetics see STEPHEN HALLIWELL, ARIsToTLE's PoRncs (1986).
304. Robert M. Luscher, The Short Story Sequence: An Open Book, in SHORT STORY
THEORY AT A CROSSROADS 148 (Susan Lohafer and Jo Ellyn Clarey, eds., 1989).
305. "Clearly, its fables should be put together dramatically, as in tragedies; concern-
ing a single whole and complete action with a beginning, middle, and end, in
order that it may give its own individual pleasure like a single whole picture."
L.J. POTrS, ARISTOTLE ON THE ART OF FICTION 51 (1968).
306. Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure, in FICTION AND
FILM 47 (1978).
307. Thomas M. Leitch, The Debunking Rhythm of the American Short Story, in SHORT
STORY THEORY AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 304, at 130, 131.
308. BRANDER MATTHEWS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SHORT STORY 22 (1901).
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sons for the sequence of the events in the plot must be discernible to
the reader, otherwise the story lacks "unity."30 9
Structural analysis describes the elements of the narrative form as
consisting of actions, happenings, characters, settings, and a discourse
of expression.310 Action is some change produced by a character or
some agent. "The character plays the role of connecting thread help-
ing us to orient ourselves amid the piling-up of details, an auxiliary
means for classing and ordering particular motives."3 11
The end-closure-of a narrative "announces and justifies the ab-
sence of further development."3 12 Closure for the traditional narra-
tive-i.e., one that is plotted, closed, and linear313-occurs with
"revelation."314 On the other hand, an unplotted and open narrative
presents problems, 315 such as leaving confusing gaps in the plot.
Moreover, "'[o]penness' becomes a deliberate refusal to comply with
expected forms of closure"316 thereby disrupting the narrative's focus.
With some adjustments these principles can be used to evaluate
legal narrative. Obviously the basic structure-discourse, plot, char-
acter, and action-must tell a law story. The presence of footnotes
should not distract from the plot or create static in the flow of the
narrative. We should get a sense of coherence in structure: "in the
beginning anything is possible; in the middle things become probable;
in the ending everything is necessary."317
A legal storyteller takes a chance in relying on the unplotted and
open style. The reason for using the narrative is to present a legal
309. Chatman, supra note 306, at 63.
310. Id. at 26.
311. Id. at 111 (quoting Tomashevsky). This quote assumes that characters are prod-
ucts of plots-a view attributed to Aristotle. Id. Chatman argues that, "A viable
theory of character should preserve openness and treat characters as autonomous
beings, not as mere plot functions." Id. at 119.
312. BARBARA HEnmsTEin SuITH, POETm CLosURE: A STUDY OF How POEMS END 36
(1968). Gerlach says: "How complete the sense of closure needs to be varies from
one period to the next, from one writer to the next, from one story to the next.
Despite this diversity, all short stories use at least one of five signals of closure:
solution of the central problem, natural termination, completion of antithesis,
manifestation of a moral, and encapsulation. Because of the large role of endings
in the structure of the short story, their influence is readily detectable." John
Gerlach, Toward the End: Closure and Structure, in Thm AAiERicAN SHORT STORY
8 (1985).
313. "The fact that we will keep reading to 'find out what happens' is, of course, the
simplest and most powerful function of linearity." SusAN LOHAFER, COAiNG TO
TE Ris wrrH THE SHORT STORY 76 (1983).
314. Leitch, supra note 307, at 131.
315. Open and unplotted narratives are indeterminate, a series of unresolved con-
flicts. "Readers had to figure things out for themselves." Lohafer, Introduction to
Part IH, SHORT STORY THEORY AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 304, at 109.
316. LOHAFER, supra note 313, at 83.
317. Chatman, supra note 306, at 46.
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issue in a different perspective or through what the outsiders call a
unique experience. Forcing the reader to make inferences in the plot
will blur the legal content and thereby confront the reader with an
unexpected barrier. The ultimate effect is to subvert the first evalua-
tion criterion of Delivering the Message.S's
The most difficult judgment is on the total aesthetic effect. The
aesthetic object is not to be confused with the real object, i.e., the piece
of marble, the print on the page, the canvas with a painting, etc. "The
aesthetic object ... is that which comes into existence when the ob-
server experiences the real object aesthetically. Thus it is a construc-
tion (or reconstruction) in the observer's mind."3 19 It is therefore not
the plot-nor the characters-nor the closure-instead, it is the
"unity" of the story that is "aesthetic."
The raison d'etre for narrative is that it adds an aesthetic perspec-
tive that is beyond traditional scholarship. The aesthetic level is
achieved by the successful application of the basic principles of narra-
tion to law. In other words, the author has the burden of becoming a
storyteller about law. Perhaps the best example of someone who has
consistently met the aesthetic burden is Norval Morris.320 I offer The
Veraswami Story as an example.32'
Blair, a District Officer for a Burmese village, learns through an
informant that his friend, Dr. Veraswami, is illegally purchasing her-
oin to relieve the pain of a dying friend. When confronted Veraswami
bluntly says: "unless you have me locked up I will continue to care for
Mr. Chanduri in the same way."322 His decision raises the legal issue
of the doctrine of necessity which is used "to determine whether an
individual's apparently criminal or immoral conduct can be excused as
the product of an unavoidable choice of evils."323 It is a linear plot
which unfolds in the classic structure of action and characters com-
pressed in beginning, middle, and closure. Pain is the motif and char-
acter development creates the conflict. Veraswami was brutalized by
a nanny as a youth, witnessed the moderating effects of drugs while
treating the wounded in WWI, and while serving in Burma dealt with
the pain of the victims of a train wreck. Each event introduces a new
twist that forces the reader to see the legal issue in a different way.
318. See supra notes 280-307 and accompanying text.
319. Chatman, supra note 306, at 27.
320. See supra notes 238-63 and accompanying text.
321. Morris, The Veraswami Story, supra note 239.
322. Id. at 980.
323. Id. at 987. 'Uneasiness about the doctrine stems from two questions: First,
should an individual be allowed any discretion about whether to violate the law?
Second, if such discretion is allowed, when can one be satisfied that this discre-
tion was not abused-for example, that the individual was not responsible for
creating (perhaps recklessly) the choice of evils? Dr. Veraswami's use of heroin to
treat patients raises those questions." Id.
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For example, Blair is tormented when he becomes suspicious that the
authorities have targeted Veraswami because they think he blotched
the train wreck rescue by favoring natives over Europeans. Closure is
particularly effective. Blair's report gives his reasons for not charging
Veraswami, 324 leaving it to his superiors-and the readers-to en-
gage in further dialogue.3 25
IX. AESTHETICS AND THE HONESTY DILEMNA
Encounter/Conflict narratives which rely on experiences raise the
issue of honesty. The experience stories are slices of autobiography
and thus are presented as true accounts of the author's life.326 The
author is saying, "Look, this is what happened to me and this is how I
feel."327 It is "the hardships endured or the risks taken in exposing a
controversial experience that enlist the reader's support."328 The au-
thor is asking the reader to rely on the honesty of the account as a
grounds for making judgments on legal issues. But, as Farber and
Sherry query, "Is the author's account what it purports to be."32 9
The reader is "betrayed" by a fictional experience and would be
suspicious-if not totally unbelieving-of the author's ultimate argu-
ment.330 The probable consequence is that the narrative will be ig-
nored. Farber and Sherry argue that the betrayal is more serious; to
them dishonesty is "intellectual deception,"331 tantamount to "re-
search fraud."332
Verification of the honesty of experiences is virtually impossible.333
Farber and Sherry's advice that "scholars should not be readily al-
lowed to offer their own experiences as evidence"334 does not address
324. Thereby conditioning "the whole of the text." Lohafer, Introduction to Part III,
SHORT STORY THEORY AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 304, at 111.
325. To help the readers, Morris includes a Selected Annotated Bibliography. Morris,
The Veraswarni Story, supra note 239, at 986-98.
326. "Autobiography is only one form among many in which a writer speaks of himself
and the incidents of his personal experience." RoY PASCAL, DESIGN AND TRUTH IN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 2 (1960).
327. "Professor Williams requires us to see the world through her eyes; her words will
not permit us the freedom to ignore her reality." Culp, supra note 222, at 545.
328. Abrams, supra note 14, at 1025.
329. Farber & Sherry, supra note 75, at 833.
330. "If the reader suspected that the author only pretended to endure this hardship
or take this risk, it might generate in the reader a feeling of betrayal, as well as
casting a shadow over any prescriptive arguments that arose from the author's
account." Abrams, supra note 14, at 1025.
331. Farber & Sherry, supra note 75, at 833.
332. Id. at 834.
333. This includes the traditional autobiography. "[Alutobiography may be a means of
revealing the truth, it may be a means of hiding it." PAScAL, supra note 326, at
63.
334. Farber & Sherry, supra note 75, at 835-36. Their waffle concludes: "We do not
mean to assert that legal scholars should consider only evidence meeting formal
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the fact that experience narration is a popular and entrenched cate-
gory of storytelling. Abrams' response is unsatisfactory in a different
way. She says that credibility of a narrative should be gauged accord-
ing to "the type of narrative offered."385 Abrams identifies two types:
"rst-person agony"3 3 6 and "insider perspective"3 37 narratives. The
latter includes experiences that "provide a metaphor for an abstract
concept,33s and "stories that persuade by prompting a flash of self-
recognition."3 3 9 Agony stories must be truthful: "[Ilt seems particu-
larly important that the pain described was experienced, in some simi-
lar form, by the author."340 On the other hand, because insider
narratives tells us "what it must be like" there is less need for verifica-
tion.3 4 1 All that is necessary is that there be some "correspondence"
between the story and the author's life."342
Evaluating honesty according to classification of experiences in-
volves a subjective judgment that renders her suggestion unworkable.
Whether a narrative is "agony" or a "metaphor" is in the eyes of the
beholder reader. For example, if a reader puts a Williams' experience
in the self-recognition category, it renders honesty irrelevant. "What
matters is that it is a vivid depiction of a deeply ambivalent experi-
ence[,] and that it is capable of evoking in readers a moment of recog-
nition that connects Williams' ostensibly particularized story with
social science standards. We cannot always afford the luxury of waiting for defin-
itive findings. Furthermore, practical reasoning allows other forms of experience
to supplement formalized research. Nevertheless, we need to be aware of the
risks in relying on unverified narratives, and take whatever steps are possible to
guard against those risks." Id. at 838.
335. Abrams, supra note 14, at 1027.
336. "In agony narratives the author reveals a painful experience-often one whose
exposure is interdicted by social taboos-in order to challenge the unap-
prehended harm inflicted by a practice or rule." Id. at 1021.
337. Insider perspective "persuades by offering a complex, highly particularized ac-
count of an experience unfamiliar to many readers .... [Ilt is not so much the
author's pain, or the risk of exposure undertaken, as the 'inside information' the
narrative provides that enlists the receptivity of the reader." Id. at 1022.
338. Id. at 1026.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1025. In critiquing Williams' work, Posner says: 'We accept one-sidedness
in literature, moreover, because we make allowance for autres temps, autres
moeurs and because factual accuracy and scholarly detachment are not rules of
the literature game. But they are rules of the scholarly game, and Williams is
writing as a scholar. If my criticisms of her in this chapter should turn out to be
one-sided, misleading, and tendentious, she would not be impressed by my re-
joining that mine is only one voice in an ongoing conversation and I can leave it to
others to rectify any omissions or imbalance in my contribution." RicHARD Pos-
NER, OVERCOMG LAw 381 (1995).
341. Abrams, supra note 14, at 1022.
342. Id. at 1026. Nevertheless, "[aln 'insider' narrative that turned out to be a com-
plete fabrication, however, would be a greater problem." Id. at 1025.
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their diverse experiences."3 43 I read the Williams narrative as an ex-
ample of an agony experience, hence honesty, under Farber and
Sherry, is critical. Someone else, on the other hand may see it as a
metaphor experience.3 44
Thus far, no one, as Farber, Sherry, and Abrams demonstrate, has
satisfactorily accommodated truth and verification with experience
narratives. The reason is obvious: absent a confession or a trial, it is
impossible to determine truthfulness.345 The solution is to consider
truth as part of the aesthetic component. The story-plot, imagery,
character development, shared experiences, and closure,-comprise
the aesthetic judgment. Under aesthetic criteria, the authors' experi-
ence must make sense and be plausible in reference to the context and
the plot of the story. "With fictions we investigate, perhaps invent, the
meaning of human life."346
The most provocative-and instructive-challenge to the honesty
issue is Professor Patricia Williams' story about her Benetton experi-
ence.34 7 It is an ideal challenge for two reasons: first, it is a classic
example of an experience narrative; second, Williams publicly raises
the honesty issue by acknowledging "rumors" that the experience was
"a fantasy."348
343. Id. at 1027.
344. Delgado seeks to avoid the truth issue by "interpretation." "The Beneton story is
intended to prompt consideration of a new legal category, namely spirit-murder.
Spirit-murder is a kind of crime; like most crimes one may not commit it with
impunity even on one's own property. Spirit-murder occurs frequently in the
lives of minority people-that is why her story rings true. Her point in telling it
was not to urge a small, incremental change in the locus of the public-private
line. Rather, she intended to call attention to the law's inadequacy in a recurring
situation. Focusing on the Farber-Sherry requirements-truth, typicality, and
conventional reasoned argument-might easily lead the reader to miss the
deeper truth at the heart of Professor Williams' story." Delgado, supra note 114,
at 675.
345. As the experiences of Alger Hiss, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Sacco, and Van-
zetti confirm, even trials are inconclusive as to the "truth" of experiences.
346. J. Hlls Miller, Narrative, in CnmcAI Tams Fon LITERARY STUDY 66, 69 (Frank
Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin eds., 1990).
347. PATcC A J. WmiLims, The Death of the Profane, in THE ALCHEMy OF RACE AND
RIGHTs 44 (1991).
348. Id. at 242 n.5. "At this point I realized it almost didn't make any difference
whether I was telling the truth or not-that the greater issue I had to face was
the overwhelming weight of a disbelief that goes beyond mere disinclination to
believe and becomes active suppression of anything I might have to say. The
greater problem is a powerfully oppressive mechanism for denial of black self-
knowledge and expression. And this denial cannot be separated from the simul-
taneously pathological willingness to believe certain things about blacks-not to
believe them, but things about them." Id. Farber and Sherry question William's
use of a Supreme Court citation "upholding a state's right to forbid blacks to tes-
tify against whites." Id. at n.3. "Even on its face, this citation fails to support the
textual assertion about the Supreme Court.... ." Farber & Sherry, supra note 75,
at 835 n.146.
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The linear plot unfolds in four successive events:349 the confronta-
tion with the Benetton clerk, attaching the poster to the store door, a
squabble with a law review editor, and retelling her story to a confer-
ence on racism. Aesthetically two of the events violate the "paradox of
truth" in storytelling which requires that the plot convince the reader
of its reality.350 This is what Chekhov meant when he said: "The aim
of fiction is absolute and honest truth."351
The first and third events do not meet this burden. Benetton is not
the type of store that would allow a teenage boy to control the en-
trance during the holiday season-or at any time. Whether it actually
happened is irrelevant, it simply does not read as reality.352 The third
event-the confrontation with the student editor-has a more serious
"reality" defect. "From the first page to the last, my fury had been
carefully cut out."3 53 Then, in the final page proofs, reference to her
race had been expunged. "What was most interesting to me in this
experience was how blind application of principles of neutrality,
through the device of omission, acted either to make me look crazy or
to make the reader participate in old habits of cultural bias."354
This interpretation simply does not make sense. In a symposium
on Excluded Voices one would expect "fury" at race exclusion to be a
critically dominant theme.355 It would, moreover, subvert "excluded
voices" objectives to impose the principle of neutrality associated with
349. As it appeared originally the story covered only the first event (Williams, Spirit-
Murdering the Messenger, supra note 262, at 127-29), the remaining three were
added in the book (WmLL s, AI ciMY, supra note 347, at 44-51).
350. RFFATERRE, FicTioNAL ThuTH xii (1990). "All literary genres are artifacts, but
none more blatantly so than fiction. Its very name declares its artificiality, and
yet it must somehow be true to hold the interest of its readers, to tell them about
experiences at once imaginary and relevant to their own lives. This paradox of
truth in fiction is the problem for which I propose to seek a solution." Id.
351. Quoted in TEN MODERN MASTERS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE SHORT STORY ix (Robert
Gorham Davis ed., 1953).
352. In his analysis of the Benetton story, Professor Culp describes the reaction of a
colleague: "No lawyer I know would have assumed that the actions of a seven-
teen year old store clerk were reflective of the actual policies of Benetton. She
should have gone to the store clerk's supervisor, written to the company head-
quarters, or sued, but she should not have responded by putting up a poster
board and writing about it in her diary. These are not the responses of a lawyer."
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., You Can Take Them to Water But You Can't Make
Them Drink: Black Legal Scholarship and White Legal Scholars, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1021, 1032. To Culp it is a matter of Black perspective and experience.
"What my colleague wants Professor Williams to do as a lawyer is act like my
colleague, a white privileged law professor, would have acted. Professor Wil-
liams's point is that in her reality such actions are often not effective." Id. at
1033.
353. WniiAms, supra note 262, at 47.
354. Id. at 48.
355. The Williams story appeared in Ramsey, Introduction, Excluded Voices: Realities
in Law and Reform, supra note 118.
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the privileged white male dominant group. This theme was in fact
expressly recognized by the editor. "This Symposium represents a
search for excluded voices, and ideas-a vital link in the chorus of
American voices."3 56
Y, CONCLUSION
Tension and conflict create a barrier of static around the discussion
of narrative. 35 7 The sources of static are multiple, including the fact
that many law academics are unfamiliar with narratives and are in-
clined to automatically dismiss the genre as a "fad." Moreover, the
defensiveness of outsiders, often expressed in a "circle the wagons" de-
mand of exclusivity,3 58 generates suspicion or even hostility.359 Fi-
nally, many traditional scholars disdain narratives on the assumption
that they offer atypical experiences of limited normative content.3 6 0
The AALS Report and recommendations confirm the importance of
resolving these problems. In fact, the growing body of scholarship on
storytelling indicates that the process has already started. Likewise,
the continued popularity of the technique among all parts of the com-
munity suggests that it is an issue that promotion and tenure commit-
tees and administrators cannot ignore. Most importantly, it is
356. Ramsey, supra note 118, at 3-4. In addition, I see a problem with closure. By
including the last two events, Williams dissipates the narrator's "fury," especially
with the conclusion of the rambling speech at the workshop.
357. A supporter of narratives concludes: "Judging by the vehemence of the responses
they are drawing, storytellers are succeeding at being provocative. But the re-
views they are drawing tend to be negative." Baron, supra note 192, at 285.
358. "Indeed, some advocates of storytelling come close to suggesting that silence is
the only permissible response to stories. Whites who sympathetically attempt to
analyze or even recount stories told by people of color are said to be guilty of
misappropriating the storyteller's pain. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 75, at
851 n.233. For example, when a white woman at a CLS summer camp referred to
a story told by a Native Canadian woman as an example to defend the use of
personal experiences, the original storyteller protested: "Did that woman intend
to appropriate my pain for her own use, stealing my very existence, as so many
other White, well-meaning, middle and upper class feminists have done?" Trina
Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implica-
tion of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991
Duxa L.J. 397, 408 n.34.
359. "The modem academic discourses of critical theory and new voices have thus far
contributed nothing to the debate on substantive legal issues beyond the con-
stant, repetitive assertion of their own relevance. Even on the issues most rele-
vant to their own concerns, they lack the basic conceptual apparatus necessary
for understanding. What we have are merely assertions that theirs is a large turf
that outsiders may not share." Richard A. Epstein, Legal Education and the Poli-
tics of Exclusion, 45 STAN. L. Rav. 1607, 1626 (1993).
360. Farber and Sherry express another tension: "[We are concerned at what seems
to be a tendency to subject scholarship to the demands of politics." Daniel A.
Farber and Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasou: Further Re-
flections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STA. L. Rav. 647, 650 (1994).
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imperative that the community makes an effective response to the
deepening fragmentation of scholars into special interest groups, each
one with its own agenda.
There are institutional reasons that rationalize the inclusion of
narrative in the law scholarship loop. It is not a new fad; instead we
have an extensive body of narrative to analyze in order to establish
evaluation criteria. The law academy has tradition of, and experience
in, embracing new forms of scholarship: doctrinal came after voca-
tional and interdisciplinary came after doctrinal. Each required ad-
justment and adaptation of criteria. It is time to acknowledge the
existence of new audiences. Richard Posner, a pioneer in interdiscipli-
nary work, says, "But where is it written that all legal scholarship
shall be in the service of the legal profession? Perhaps the ultimate
criterion of all scholarship is utility, but it need not be utility to a par-
ticular audience."3 6 1 Finally, as I have argued in this Article, it is
possible to compose an evaluation scheme that with adaptation is con-
sistent with conventional views.
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